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Transformed, Not Transcended:
The Role of Extrajudicial Dispute
Resolution in Antebellum Kentucky and
New Jersey
by

CARLI

N.

CONKLIN*

Extrajudicial dispute resolution, that is, the resolution of disputes
outside the judicial process, was a recognized method of resolving disputes under the common law of England. Extrajudicial dispute resolution
gained statutory recognition and formality through the late-eighteenth and
early-nineteenth centuries not only in England, but also in America as
several newly-formed states encouraged the use of extrajudicial dispute
resolution through their emerging state governments. Evidence demonstrates that in some states, this use and encouragement of extrajudicial
dispute resolution remained robust throughout the antebellum period.
In his work, The Transformationof American Law: 1780-1860, noted
legal scholar Morton J. Horwitz studies the use of extrajudicial forms of
dispute resolution in antebellum America. Horwitz asserts that arbitration
declined after the Revolutionary War and that the legal system triumphed
over arbitration to become the preferred means of dispute resolution in
antebellum America.1 He bases his theory of arbitration's demise and the
legal system's triumph in antebellum America on notions of who used
arbitration, who supported arbitration, and who opposed arbitration, ultimately leading to its decline. Horwitz's discussion focuses on two areas.
First, he focuses on the practice of arbitration within the mercantile community, stating that merchants preferred arbitration as a more efficient and
cost-effective means of settling disputes. Furthermore, and most importantly for his thesis, Horwitz asserts that merchants originally chose arbitration over the legal system because the common law had not adapted to
mercantile needs. Thus, merchants favored arbitration because they
believed that their disputes were better resolved by arbitrators who were
*Assistant Professor of History, Co-Director, Pre-Law Professional Program, John Brown
University. This article began as a master's thesis in history at the University of Virginia
under the supervision of Barry Cushman and Charles McCurdy. Additional research for this
article was funded by a Shipps Scholar Grant from John Brown Univeristy. Portions of this
article were presented at faculty colloquia at University of Virginia School of Law and John
Brown University. The author is grateful for insights and critiques provided by the law and
history faculty at Virginia (especially Barry Cushman, Charles McCurdy, Michael Klarman,
and Kathy Bradley) and colleagues at John Brown Univeriisty (especially Ed Ericson IlI and
Preseton Jones). Emily Tidmore and Alvin Velazquez provided helpful editorial comments
Kassandra Bently contributed reseach assistance in the latter stages of the article. The views
presented here and any errors remain the responsibility of the author.
1. For the following summary, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 145-55 (Harvard University Press 1977).
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often merchants themselves and who understood and more favorably
applied the mercantile law.
According to Horwitz, although merchant arbitration prevailed in
colonial and early America, the emerging legal system in the postRevolutionary War era grew increasingly hostile to arbitration in any form.
Horwitz states that, over time, and in response to this hostility, merchants
and lawyers struck an implicit deal in which the judiciary produced procommercial legal decisions in exchange for the merchants' willingness to
turn away from arbitration and toward the legal system as the settlor of
their disputes. Horwitz garners the bulk of his support from New York
with additional support coming from Massachusetts, 2 Pennsylvania, 3 and
South Carolina. 4 From this basis, he asserts that the relationship between
the merchants and the legal profession that led the merchants to use arbitration (and, later, led the merchants to abandon arbitration) was not limited to these states but was "a general theme in colonial America." 5
Horwitz's second area of focus is arbitration use among Quakers, especially the Pennsylvania Quakers.6 Horwitz asserts that, although the Quakers
strongly encouraged arbitration among their members and, therefore, contributed to the initial rise of arbitration in Pennsylvania, the emerging legal
elite, as embodied in the judiciary, became hostile to the use of arbitration
and eventually forced it out of existence. In his discussion, Horwitz does not
draw a distinction between a judicial system increasingly hostile to mercantile arbitration and how the judicial system in Pennsylvania responded to the
specifically Quaker use of arbitration in that state.
From his study of the New York merchant community (with some
additional information from Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and South
Carolina) and the Pennsylvania Quaker community, Horwitz concludes
that the antebellum demise of arbitration was not limited to these states
but was a general pattern of decline necessary for the growth of the power
and prestige of the legal profession in early nineteenth century America. 7
The purpose of this paper is to explore the applicability of that conclusion
2. For Horwitz's discussion of Massachusetts, see id. at 151. Horwitz states that the
Massachusetts judiciary sought to undermine statutory arbitration by reversing arbitration
awards on technicalities and by strictly construing the arbitration statute. These points are
reflective of Horwitz's broader New York discussion.
3. For Horwitz's discussion of Pennsylvania, see id. at 151-54. Horwitz states that
Pennsylvania, whose antilegalism largely stemmed from Quaker doctrine, nevertheless demonstrated a hostility toward extrajudicial dispute resolution that "was similar to that in other
states," with the judiciary seeking to set aside arbitration awards and discourage their use and
power. Horwitz ties this hostility back to attitudes about commercial law. Id. at 152-54.
4. For Horwitz's discussion of South Carolina, see id. at 154. Horwitz asserts that the
South Carolina judiciary began to intervene in arbitration awards more frequently, undermining the authority of the awards and therefore fatally weakening the incentive to make use of
extrajudicial dispute resolution in the first place, particularly in disputes of commercial law.
5. Id. at 146. For a discussion of the general pattern of this change in the merchants' and
judges' previous support for extrajudicial dispute resolution in America, see id. at 140, 154-55.
6. For the following summary, see id. at 151-54.
7. id. at 140, 154-56.
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to two states not studied by Horwitz: Kentucky and New Jersey. The study
of Kentucky, a state that was largely agricultural in the antebellum period,
will provide a case study for the argument that the destruction of arbitration in antebellum America was mainly due to a merchant-lawyer alliance.
A powerful merchant-lawyer alliance seems doubtful for a state such as
Kentucky, which was largely pre-industrial/pre-commercial in the antebellum period. Indeed, the research shows that while merchants may have
aligned with lawyers and judges on some issues, a merchant-lawyer
alliance as a means to eliminate arbitration did not occur in Kentucky in
this time period. Neither did the effects of a merchant-lawyer alliance
manifest themselves in this time period. Kentucky's legislative and judicial branches continually upheld the viability of arbitration throughout the
antebellum period. Furthermore, other factors in Kentucky contributed to
arbitration's consistently strong-even preferred-usage as a means of
dispute resolution throughout the antebellum period.
The study of New Jersey, a state that, like Pennsylvania, was largely
Quaker in origin, provides a case study for the argument that even in
largely pro-arbitration Quaker areas, the judiciary became hostile to and
eventually triumphed over the use of arbitration. A close study of Quaker
meeting records and New Jersey statutory and case law demonstrates that
the New Jersey judiciary remained supportive of arbitration throughout
the antebellum period. In contrast to the idea of a hostile judiciary, the
New Jersey judiciary continually upheld and promoted the use of arbitration through dicta and decisions that followed the New Jersey arbitration
statutes and were in keeping with the long-standing Quaker notions of
arbitration that those statutes reflected.
Thus, the research in Kentucky and New Jersey demonstrates that,
instead of declining arbitration enjoyed a continued usage in these states
throughout the antebellum period. Furthermore, the research suggests that
arbitration was not only seen as equal to the courts as a method of dispute
resolution but may have, in some respects, served as the preferred method of
dispute resolution for many in these states throughout the antebellum period,
with litigation in a court of law acting as the secondary dispute resolution
mechanism. The distinctions in Kentucky and New Jersey have implications
not only for the role of extrajudicial dispute resolution these two states, but
also for its role in antebellum America as a whole, since additional research
8
may demonstrate countervailing factors in other states, as well.
8. For an insightful critique of the working out of Horwitz's thesis in New York, see
Eben Moglen, Note, Commercial Arbitration in the Eighteenth Century: Searching for the
Transformation of American Law, 93 YALE L.J. 135 (1983). Among other points, Moglen
argues that Horwitz erred in asserting that a decline in reference indicated a decline in use of
extrajudicial resolution in general. Moglen claims the decline was likely the result of a 1791
act that encouraged New Yorkers to use arbitration instead of reference, thus, suggesting that
extrajudicial dispute resolution, in general, continued to be strong. In addition, Moglen disagrees with Horwitz's claim that the legal profession wrested several key powers away from
arbitrators and referees. Rather than having these powers eliminated by a jealous legal profession, Moglen asserts that these powers were not powers traditionally exercised by arbitrators and referees in the first place.
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KENTUCKY
In order to test the applicability of Horwitz's thesis to Kentucky, we
must first understand his account of New York and then consider how that
account is similar to or different from the historical context of Kentucky.
A Merchant-Lawyer Alliance in New York
In his explanation of the rise and fall of extrajudicial dispute resolution from 1780 to 1860, Horwitz asserts that the conflict between merchants and a pre-commercial legal profession that led merchants to use
arbitration "was a general theme in colonial America." 9 In describing the
merchant-lawyer alliance that he claims defeated the use of arbitration,
however, Horwitz draws his evidence largely from studies of the eastern
states of New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina,
particularly New York. In his discussion of New York, Horwitz identifies
several colonial and early national trends to support his thesis, including:
(1) a "campaign against lawyers" based on anti-lawyer sentiment
stemming from merchants' perception of lawyers as having pre-commercial attitudes; (2) an initial increased use of arbitration as a means to
resolve disputes, presumably due to lawyers' pre-commercial attitudes;
and, (3) the passage of statutes to support arbitration in this time period.10
Once Horwitz identifies these trends supporting the existence and
growth of arbitration, he then claims that each of these pro-arbitration
trends shifted at the turn of the century."1 As evidence of this shift, he first
cites an emergence of "a new willingness of the judges to reverse arbitration awards for technical deficiencies" after 1799 and a judicial trend in
which "the traditional common law deference to the reports of arbitrators
had begun rapidly to dissipate."1 2 Second, Horwitz cites an 1801 case as
an example of a trend in which the courts refused to refer any case to an
arbitrator if the case might have a question of law. 13 Finally, Horwitz
claims that although statutes had been passed to support arbitration, those
14
statutes were continually undermined by the courts.
Horwitz applies his New York account to colonial and early
America in general. According to Kentucky case law, however, the proarbitration attitude that Horwitz was to have declined in New York and
across America by the turn of the century was still displayed by the
Kentucky courts as late as 1860.
9. Id. at 146.
10. Id. at 146-49, 151.

11. Id. at 150.
12. Id. (citing Parkerv. Avery, Kirby 353 (Conn. 1787). 2 Z. Swift, A System of the Laws
of the State of Connecticut 7-8, 17 (1795)).

13. Id. (citing De Hart v. Covenhaven, 2 Johns. Cas. 402 (N.Y. 1801)).
14. Id. at 149, 151.
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Evidence of a Merchant-Lawyer Alliance in Kentucky?
The first point of departure between Kentucky and Horwitz's thesis
is in the nature of the economic community during the time period studied. Horwitz's study is based on the existence of a strong mercantile community that practiced arbitration and opposed the growing legal system.15
The problem in generalizing these claims beyond the more mercantile
eastern states is that not all states at this time had an economic base driven
by the merchant class. By claiming that merchant-lawyer relations alone
explain the rise and fall of arbitration in America, Horwitz neglects to
explain how this phenomenon could convincingly apply to states like
Kentucky, whose economic base remained largely agricultural through the
first half of the nineteenth century, and whose use of arbitration did not
depend upon a merchant class. Mary Bonsteel Tachau provides this
description of Kentucky in the early 1790s:
What was then the western district of Virginia was a wilderness, only recently
vacated by Indians who frequently recrossed the Ohio River to attack the AngloAmericans who had taken their hunting and farming lands. It was a forested and
fertile land which promised great productivity and wealth to those who could
but it was a land that could be reached only after hazardous
hold and exploit it,
journeys along primitive trials or along the rivers. No stagecoaches penetrated the
region, and the unimproved Wilderness Road, recently carved through the mountains, was too rugged for wagons. There was no mail service: even letters from
President Washington and his secretary of war were carried in the packs and saddlebags of private citizens. Communications within and away from the area were
exceedingly irregular. 16
7
Although there were explorations into Kentuckyl in the 1750s, the
first real efforts at settlement did not occur until around 1775 near what is
today Lexington.1 8 After 1780, Kentucky began to be settled at the rate of
approximately 5,000 people per year, many of whom were former
9
Virginians with rural backgrounds.1 These former Virginians were a
turned to
much "less urban people than the more northern colonists" and
20
Kentucky to "seek fresh fields" for their agricultural pursuits.
By the late 1780s, Kentucky was a rich producer of "grain, cattle,

15. Id. at 140.
16. MARY K. BONSTEEL TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: KENTUCKY

1789-1816 14 (Princeton University Press 1978).
17. To avoid confusion, I will refer to the land that became the state of Kentucky as
"Kentucky" both before and after statehood.
18. N.S. SHALER, KENTUCKY: A PIONEER COMMONWEALTH 60-67 (Houghton, Mifflin and
Company, Boston and New York, and The Riverside Press, Cambridge 1884); and WILLIAM
B. ALLEN, A HISTORY OF KENTUCKY, EMBRACING GLEANINGS, REMINISCENCES, ANTIQUITIES,
NATURAL CURIOSITIES, STATISTICS, AND BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF PIONEERS, SOLDIERS,
JURISTS, LAWYERS, STATESMEN, DIvINES, MECHANICS, FARMERS, MERCHANTS, AND OTHER
LEADING MEN, OF ALL OCCUPATIONS AND PURSUITS 144 (Bradley & Gilbert, Publishers,

Louisville, KY 1872).
19. SHALER, supra note 18, at 55, 80.
20. Id.

HeinOnline -- 48 Am. J. Legal Hist. 43 2006

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY

Vol. XLVIII

hogs, sheep, fruits, and fiber."21 Kentucky became known for growing
grain and livestock and, after 1800, its economic influence continued to
increase. 22 Settlements continued 23 and in the first decade of the 1800s,
Kentucky farmers made use of river routes for trade, sending their produce to New Orleans, while eastern merchants came to the area to trade
their merchandise for produce they then sold in northeastern cities. 24 By
the 1850s, Kentucky's largest source of prosperous trade was her waterways. 25 It was not until the mid-1800s, however, that Kentucky's capital
became a center for agriculture and commerce. 26 Instead, the Kentucky
plains were "ruled" by "a comfortable agrarian society" comparable to "a
planting society not unlike that of the lower southern cotton belt."27 The
mountainous portions of the state were also agricultural, although not as
prosperous as other portions of the state. 28 Kentucky's economy was built
on agriculture and even the cities and towns reflected an agricultural bent;
in the early days of Kentucky they "were no more than gathering places
for expatriate farmers and a few tradesmen and professional people. They
all looked to the countryside rather than within themselves for economic
29
strength."
Kentucky's growing population began to call for separation from
Virginia in the early 1780s, and Congress admitted Kentucky into the
Union effective June 1, 1792.30 Kentucky assembled a convention to form
its first State constitution in April of 1793 and from the beginning of
statehood it began establishing courts of justice. 3 1
One predicament that immediately pressed upon those courts was the
settlement of a multitude of land-dispute claims. In encouraging settlement of the region before statehood, Kentucky had instructed each land
claimant to make his own survey of the land and then record that survey
in the state land office. 32 This procedure allowed for speedy settlement
but also resulted in conflicting land claims by those who had independently conducted their own surveys, those who were granted land rights
through chartered land companies, and those who were granted land rights
through military warrants. 33 Within the first ten years of settlement, some
21. THOMAS D. CLARK, KENTUCKY: LAND OF CONTRAST 34 (Harper & Row, Publishers,
New York 1968).
22. Id. at 36.
23. SHALER, supra note 18, at 81.
24. CLARK, supra note 21, at 34.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 123.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id. at 38.
SHALER, supra note 18, at 93, 107.
Id. at 107, 112.
Id. at 49, 50.
Id. at 50; TACHAU, supra note 16, at 167-68.

HeinOnline -- 48 Am. J. Legal Hist. 44 2006

2006

EXTRAJUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ANTEBELLUM KENTUCKY
AND NEW JERSEY

45

parts of the state experienced more than three times as many claims as
there was land available. 34 By 1779, Kentucky had approximately 20,000
settlers with so many land-dispute claims that Virginia, which then governed the territory, had to appoint a land commission to review and
resolve the claims. 35 Although the commission reviewed 1,400 claims and
confirmed 1,328, this only gave resolution to claims over approximately
1/8 of the land in the region. 36 After the appointment of the land commission, Virginia passed a statute to resolve the Kentucky land controversies,
steps required to quiet title,
but this proved a failure due to the multiple
37
which worked to create additional disputes.
As a result of these failed efforts, the conflict over how to settle land
disputes continued and was an issue that dominated the docket of the
Kentucky judiciary from the first breath of statehood. As the new state of
Kentucky began to form its governing framework, it was aided by those settlers from Virginia who had brought with them not only agricultural interests, but also notions of a sophisticated and well-trained judicial system that
adhered to the English common law and traditions. 38 The settlers had
known such a system in Virginia and worked to implement it in Kentucky.
Neither the statutory nor common law of Virginia, however, held an adequate remedy for the prevailing land disputes. 39 Land-dispute claims
became so numerous in the first years of Kentucky statehood that in the
1790s Henry Clay's mother told her son to come to Kentucky where there
40
was good income for lawyers who would defend land-dispute cases.
The impact of the land use controversy on litigation was reflected in
the debates between the radicals and moderates leading up to Kentucky's
first constitutional convention in 1792. The radicals in the state promoted a
constitutional proposal to prohibit lawyers from holding government positions.4 1 There were fears that if the lawyers were allowed into the legislature, they would use their positions of power to complicate the law in order
to insure their own employment and also to take hold of the property of the
working man. 42 The radicals wanted a simple, direct, and responsive form
34. CLARK, supra note 21, at 30.
35. TACHAU, supra note 16, at 169.

36. Id. (citing Samuel M. Wilson, The First Land Court of Kentucky 1779-1780 43-47
(Lexington, KY 1923).
37. Id. (citing William Waller Hening, The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of all the
Laws of Virginia from the First Session of the Legislature, in the Year 1619, x (New York,
1823), 35-65; Littell, Statute Law of Kentucky, 1, 392-464.)
38. Id. at 15. (citing David H. Flaherty, An Introductionto Early American Legal History,
in Flaherty, ed., Essays in the History of Early American Law, 25; Charles Warren, The
Supreme Court in United States History, I (Boston, 1926), 37; Ellis, Jeffersonian Crisis, 121;
Herbert A. Johnson et. al., The Papers of John Marshall, I (Chapel Hill, NC., 1974)).
Notably, the English common law included the use of arbitration. See WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 16-17.
39. CLARK, supra note 2 1, at 32.
40. Id. at 31.
41. Id. at 124. (citing Kentucky Gazette (Lexington), 24 December 1791).
42. Id. (citing 7 Kentucky Gazette (Lexington), 7 January 1792).
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of government based on a "'simple and concise code of laws' which would
then eliminate the need for lawyers." 4 3 The moderates disagreed and
favored an independent (as opposed to elected) judiciary.44 They argued
that a more complex and intricate system of law and justice was beneficial
because it took decisionmaking out of the "arbitrary will of the rulers." 45
In 1796 and 1797, land use continued to fuel the governance debate
in Kentucky. Radical movements for a second constitutional convention
were countered with the moderates' use of property rights rhetoric as a
way to appeal to the "overwhelming majority" of Kentucky citizens who
owned land. 46 The agrarian land owners were not so easily swayed, however, and spoke out against the passage of "agrarian laws" which they
believed lawyers would use to take "one half of your land to advocate
your claim to the other .. "47 The radicals "emphasized the necessity of
freeing the state from aristocratic control, of finding some way of settling
the numerous land disputes whose 'perplexity and expense of law proceedings loudly call for some constitutional provisions ... '48 They also
promoted the establishment of a circuit court system "which they believed
would help make the administration of justice cheap, convenient, and
locally oriented." 49 The moderates opposed this proposal, however, and it
was ultimately defeated.50
At the crux of these disagreements in law and governance was the
fact that the moderates promoted a more educated and experienced elected class, especially lawyers, while radicals promoted the common man
and decried the election of lawyers and judges whom they believed to be
against the interests of the country and the common man. 5 1 In contrast to
Horwitz's thesis, which claims that the merchants' dislike of lawyers' pre43. Id. at 124-25. (citing Kentucky Gazette (Lexington), 15 October 1791; "Rob the
Thrasher,"; Kentucky Gazette (Lexington), 17, 24 December 1791).
44. Id. at 125. (citing Kentucky Gazette (Lexington) 18 February 1792 and 24 September,
1 October, 1791; "The Disinterested Citizen," Kentucky Gazette (Lexington), 22, 29
October, 31 December 1791, and 25 February 1792; "Little Brutus," Kentucky Gazette
(Lexington), 17, 24 December 1791; "X.Y.X.", Kentucky Gazette (Lexington), 18 February
1792).
45. Id. (citing "Felte Firebrand," Kentucky Gazette (Lexington), 12 November 1791;
"The Disinterested Citizen" Kentucky Gazette (Lexington), 22 October 1791).
46. RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG
REPUBLIC 139-142 (Oxford University Press 1971). In order to win popular support, the
moderates asserted that the radicals were against private property rights, an assertion that the
radicals denied. See id. at 142, 146.
47. Id. at 142-43. (citing "A Voter," ibid., 17 April 1798; William Warfield to John
Breckinridge, 22 April 1798, Breckinridge Papers, LC).
48. Id. at 143. (citing "A Voter," Stewart's Kentucky Herald (Frankfort), 17 April 1798;
"A Friend to Senates," Kentucky Gazette (Lexington), 25 April 1798; "Cassius," ibid., 2
May 1798; H. Marshall, History, II, 246-47).
49. Id. at 147.
50. Id. at 147-48 (citing "Notes on the Debates," 30 July-2 August 1799, Breckinridge
Papers, LC; Joseph H. Parks, Felix Grundy (Baton Rouge, 1940), 12-13).
51. Id. at 125-26.
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commercial mind-set formed the basis for anti-lawyer hostility, 52 the antilawyer sentiment in Kentucky seemed based not on a view of lawyers as
pre-commercial, but on the common man's fear of the lawyers' great ability to grasp and garner potentially abusive power, power that could
infringe on the common man's land and property rights.
Not only were anti-lawyer fears not instigated by commercial interests, but neither were the claims that made their way to court. It was the
seemingly infinite number of land claims that formed the basis for legal

disputes in Kentucky at this time. 53 Richard Ellis states:
Land was what Kentucky was all about. It was in search of land that the speculator,
the planter, and the farmer had dared to venture across the mountains in the first
place. And in no other state of the union was there as much confusion over land titles
as in Kentucky. The origins of the situation lay in the unsystematic manner by which
Virginia had distributed its western lands. The Old Dominion had parceled out its
Kentucky lands first as a bonus to soldiers for fighting in the French and Indian War,
then as a grant to the Transylvania Company, and finally as an inducement to obtain
enlistments during the War for Independence. Moreover, many had made purchase
through the land office, while thousands of small farmers had simply settled on what
appeared to be unclaimed land. As little was known about the geography of
Kentucky, the locations of the various grants were only vaguely described. Efforts
made to survey the area merely complicated the problem. Because the surveyors
were constantly harassed by hostile Indians, their work tended to be inaccurate. In
addition, over a period of several years, the same terrain of land was often marked
off several times, so that what might be designated as an individual lot by one surveyor would be included as different parts of several continuous lots by another. As a
result of these overlappings, the state became 'shingled over' with land claims to
54
which two, three, and sometimes even four and five persons held conflicting titles.

In 1784, "most Kentuckians were non-landowners living in the midst
of enormous tracts held by absentees, 'tenants of the log cabin' they were
called.
...55 Absentee landowners would bring ejectment suits against
these occupying settlers. 5 6 Kentucky was sympathetic to these settlers
who might not have even known of the absentee landowners and who,

believing themselves to be the rightful owners, had already made
improvements on the land.57 As Kentucky entered statehood, it became
even more important to resolve these land disputes. An overwhelming
52. HORWITZ, supranote I at 146-48. Horwitz terms this type of antilegalism as "compatible" with mercantile antilegalism.
53. ELLIS, supra note 46, at 130. Disputes over competing land claims are replete
throughout the early published state court decisions and land disputes dominated the federal
court docket as well, comprising almost half of all private suits brought to federal courts in
Kentucky from 1789-1816. TACHAU, supra note 16, at 167.
54. Id. at 134. (citing W.R. Jillson, The Kentucky Land Grants (Louisville, 1925);
Connelly and Coulter, History of Kentucky, I, 212-220; Francois Andre Michaux, "Travels
to the West of the Alleghany Mountains," Reuben Gold Thwaites (ed.), Early Western
Travels, 1748-1846 (32 vols., Cleveland, 1934), II, 227-28.)
55. PAUL W. GATES, LANDLORDS AND TENANTS ON THE PRAIRIE FRONTIER: STUDIES IN

AMERICAN LAND POLICY 21 (Cornell University Press 1973), stating in footnote 15 "Senator
Clement C. Clay of Alabama used this term, not critically, in 1841, in a discussion of preemption (Cong. Globe, 23 Cong., 2 Sess., Appendix, 18 [Jan. 4, 1841])."
56. Id. at 21.
57. Id.
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majority of people in Kentucky either owned or thought they owned land,
and the endless disputes over land titles inhibited immigration and economic development since people did not feel secure in purchasing land or
in selling or improving the land they thought they owned. 58 The situation
drastically worsened in 1794 when the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which
had been given original jurisdiction in all land-dispute claims, decided
Kenton v. McConnell, a case that "threatened to overturn thousands of
land titles" by stating that the previous findings of the Virginia-appointed
land commission could be reversed. 59 In response to this upheaval came
cries that the Kenton decision was the fruit of land speculators and
lawyers. 60 It seemed the radicals' fears of lawyers as a class that would
upset their property rights had been realized.
In response to the fallout from Kenton, the Federalists and dissident
moderates joined with the radicals and led a reorganization of the judiciary. 6 1 The legislature passed acts in 1795 that limited the judiciary,
revoked the Court of Appeals' original jurisdiction in land-dispute claims,
and prohibited justices of the peace and sheriffs from being elected to the
General Assembly. 62 Furthermore, in the year following the Kenton decision, the radicals achieved the far-reaching reform they desired with the
1795 Act Concerning Arbitrations, an Act which provided statutory support for extrajudicial means of dispute resolution. 63 Kentucky's first
broad-ranging arbitration act followed on the heels of widespread discontent with the court system's handling of land-dispute claims as epitomized
in the Court of Appeals' Kenton v. McConnell decision. The case that
threw the state into upheaval over the legitimacy of land titles also instigated legislative acts that paved the way for arbitration to hold a strong
place in Kentucky dispute resolution for years to come. 64
58. ELLIS, supra note 46, at 130, 142. See also GATES, supra note 55, at 14-15, 19.
59. Id. at 131 (citing Mss Journal of the Kentucky House of Delegates, June 1792, 7; also
reprinted in Kentucky Gazette (Lexington), 23 June 1792); 135 (citing I Hughes Reports,
134-169); and 134. (citing W.R. Jillson, The Kentucky Land Grants (Louisville, 1925);
Connelly and Coulter, History of Kentucky, 1,212-220.)
60. Id. at 135.

61. Id. at 136.
62. Id. at 136. (citing Humphrey Marshall, History of Kentucky, Volume II, 156-57, 169
(Frankfort, 1824)).
63. Id. at 136-37. (citing Kentucky Sessional Laws of 1795 (Frankfort, 1796), Chapter
XV, Evans #30656.)
64. Indeed, my research shows that land-dispute claims formed the largest single subject
of known dispute in arbitration cases brought to court in Kentucky between 1780-1860.
Decade
1780-1790
1791-1800
1801-1810
1811-1820
1821-1830
1831-1840
1841-1850
1851-1860
Total Disputes by Type

Land
Disputes
0
2
8
9
8
5
1
0
33

Merchant
Disputes
0
0
1
1
3
1
1
1
8

Other
Disputes
0
0
9
2
5
8
3
4
31

Unknown
Disputes
0
0
15
4
10
4
4
5
42
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The Act Concerning Arbitrations was passed on December 19, 1795.65

The preface to the Act stated that it was intended to address the problem of
the "enormous expences [sic]" and "tedious length of time" that lawsuits
entail, which cause them to be an "almost total denial of justice."66 The Act
provided that it would be lawful for parties in a dispute to mutually submit
the dispute to arbitrators of their own choosing. 67 The parties to the dispute
would then refer the arbitrators to a court of the parties' own choosing. 68
The dispute would be entered in the court record and the arbitrators would
be given the same power as the courts enjoyed to subpoena witnesses and
compel their attendance and compliance in providing evidence. 69
The 1795 Act also required arbitrators to take an oath of impartiality
in deciding the dispute. 70 The arbitrators were given jurisdiction to "hear
and determine all matters of dispute to them refered [siC]."71 Once the case
had been decided, the arbitrators were to give a copy of the award to each
party and to the court that had set out the order of arbitration. 72 The copy
given to the court would "be entered of record, and become a final end and
[decision] of all and every controversy or suit to them so submitted, and
be made a decree of such court.

... 73 An arbitration decree could be

invalidated only if there was evidence that it was "procured by corruption
or other undue means" or that there "was evident partiality in the arbitrators or umpires." 74 Where such corruption or partiality was evident, the
award would be set aside and the injured party would be allowed to appeal
only to the Court of Appeals and only if he did so within three months and
provided notice to the other party. 75 If the appeal was not brought within
three months, then the award would be executed. 76 The statute also supported arbitration by providing monetary compensation for the court
clerks who filed the arbitration orders, the arbitrators who heard the dispute and made the award, and the attending witnesses, just as in court. 77
Two years after passing the 1795 Act Concerning Arbitrations, the
Kentucky legislature again broadened the power of arbitration with "An
Act Concerning Guardians, Infants, Masters and Apprentices." 78 The bulk
65. AcTS OF 1795, Ch. 9. To ease the reading of these statutes, I have replaced the 'f
marking given for the 's' sound with 's' when necessary to comport with contemporary
spelling.
66. Id. (Preamble).
67. Id. at § I.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at § 2.
74. Id.

75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id. at § 3.
Id. at § 5.
ACTs OF 1796-1797,Ch. 15.
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of this Act dealt generally with the duties of guardians toward their wards,
but one section in particular gave guardians the ability to use arbitration to
settle the disputes of their wards. 79 While the 1795 Act implicitly seemed
to be a reaction to concern over land-dispute claims, the arbitration portion of the 1797 Act was explicitly so. Specifically, it granted guardians
the right to use arbitration in their wards' disputes when those disputes
80
centered on land claims.
In February of 1798, the legislature passed yet another statute on
81
arbitration, entitled, "An Act Concerning Awards." The Act repealed
82
previous acts concerning arbitration and awards and set forth the following: (1) any persons in controversy could appoint any person(s) to settle
their claim; (2) if that was done before a suit was pending, then the parties
were to submit their controversy to a court, which would then issue an
order to the arbitrators; (3) the order was to state the matter in dispute that
was decided; (4) if an arbitrator failed to discharge the reference order,
then either party could provide "satisfactory proof thereof' to either discharge the reference order or appoint another arbitrator; (5) the arbitrators
had the power to call witnesses and issue fines or penalties as in a court of
law if the witness failed to appear and give testimony; (6) the arbitrators
were instructed to take an oath of impartiality; (7) the arbitrators had to
provide a copy of the award to each party and to the court that issued the
order at the next session of that court meeting; (8) there had to be at least
15 days from the issuance of the award until its delivery at the court; (9)
the court was to enter the award and make a judgment or decree; (10) the
award was not to "be invalidated, set aside or appealed from, unless it
shall be made appear to the court, that such award was obtained by corruption, evident partiality, or other undue means"; (11) if either party
alleged "corruption, evident, partiality, or other undue means" it could
appeal to the Court of Appeals; (12) the appellant had to provide notice to
the appellee within ten days after obtaining the appeal; (13) the appellant
had to provide a copy of the notice and the lower court record to the Court
lose his right to appeal if he did
of Appeals; and (14) the appellant would
83
not comply with all the requirements.
After stating the procedure through which parties could arbitrate, the
legislature went on to strongly uphold the validity of such awards, stating:
No award made by virtue of this act, shall be liable to be examined into, superseded or revised by writ of error, or be set aside by the court to which it may be
returned for want of form only, nor for other irregularity, if by such award, it
manifestly appears, that the suit, matter, or controversy submitted is thereby
finally and certainly decided. Provided nevertheless, that nothing herein
79. Id. at § 2.
80. Id.
81. ACTS OF IST SESSION, 1798, Ch. 25.
82. It did not, however, repeal the Act of 1797, which gave guardians the authority to
submit their wards' land disputes to arbitration. See Galloway's Heirs v. Webb, 3 Ky. 326,
332 (Ct. App. 1808).
83. An Act Concerning Awards, supra note 81, at §§ 1, 2, 6.
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contained shall be construed to take from courts of equity their power over
84
awards, arbitraments or umpirages.

Thus the 1798 Act upheld the validity and strength of arbitration by
providing for substance over form, clarifying appeal procedures, and
retaining arbitrators' previous jurisdiction. It was the language of this Act,
first asserted in response to land-dispute claims in 1795, expanded to
include guardians in 1797, and refined here in 1798, that formed the basis
for the legislature's enactments on arbitration for the next fifty years.
On July 1, 1852, the General Assembly enacted the Revised Statutes
of Kentucky. 85 Chapter 3 of the Revised Statutes outlined the procedures
for arbitrations and awards. 86 In 1854, the Code of Practice in Civil and
Criminal Cases for the State of Kentucky (hereinafter Code of Practice)
codified the Revised Statutes' provisions for arbitration and awards in
title X, chapter 8, section 499, subsections 1-9.87 The only change made
to the provisions as contained in the Revised Statutes was to strike the
words "of chancery" from the Revised Statutes, chapter 3, section 8.88
84. Id. at § 3.
85. RICHARD H. STANTON, THE REVISED STATUTES OF KENTUCKY, APPROVED AND

ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1851 AND 1852, AND IN FORCE FROM JULY 1, 1852
WITH ALL THE AMENDMENTS SUBSEQUENTLY ENACTED, AND NOTES OF THE DECISIONS OF THE

COURTS OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY, VOLUME I, (Robert Clarke & Co., Cincinnati, 1860)

(hereinafter REVISED STATUTES). The version of the Revised Statutes that is cited here
appears to be the original Revised Statutes from 1852 with amendments and notes of court
cases added at the end of each section. Id. at 129, § 499.
86. Id. at VIII, 181-184.
87. M.C. JOHNSON, ET AL., CODE OF PRACTICE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES, FOR THE

STATE OF KENTUCKY 129-131 (A.G. Hodges, Public Printer, Frankfort, 1854) (hereinafter
CODE OF PRACTICE). The preface to this volume provides a history for the Kentucky Code.
This same language concerning arbitration was adopted under section 499 in subsequent versions of the Code of Practice. The headnote summary of this text describes the procedures
for arbitration as follows: "§ 499. Proceedings to be according to chapter 3 of Revised
Statutes. 1. Manner of submitting controversy by rule of court. 2. The arbitrators to be
sworn. Their oath. May examine parties on oath. 3. May issue subpoenas for witnesses, and
report to court the failue [sic] of witnesses to attend or testify. 4. Personal representatives,
committees, and guardians may make a submission. 5. If arbitrator refuses to act, reference
may be set aside. 6. Trial before arbitrators, and their award. 7. How the award to be made
the judgment of the court. 8. No award to be set aside for defect of form. Courts of equity to
have jurisdiction over awards. 9. Matters in justice's jurisdiction may be submitted by rule
or order injustice's court, on which same proceedings may be had. Subject to appeal."
88. Id. at 129, § 499. The omission of "of chancery" may have been to distinguish the
already existing dual law and equity functions of the Court of Appeals from the equity function of the newly created Louisville Chancery Court. The Court of Appeals was granted
jurisdiction in both law and equity under Article V. Section 1 of the First Constitution of
Kentucky (June 1, 1792). This power was re-asserted through Article IV, Section 1 of the
Second Constitution of Kentucky (August 17, 1799) and Article IV, Section 1 of the Third
Constitution of Kentucky (June 11,1850). A new court called the Louisville Chancery Court
was established in 1835 and then included in Article IV, Section 40 of the Third Constitution
of Kentucky (June 11, 1850). It is possible that it was deemed necessary to remove "of
chancery" from the Revised Statutes as a way to ensure that the language would not be misconstrued to mean that only the Louisville Chancery Court would be able to exercise this
power of equity. Whatever the reasoning, the language changed from "No award shall be set
aside for the want of form; but courts of chancery shall have power over awards on equitable
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The form of arbitration and award provided for under the Revised
Statutes in 1852, and included in the 1854 Code of Practice, was very similar to that which had been passed in 1795 and 1798 following the
upheaval over land-dispute claims. Indeed, land-dispute claims continued
to provide a significant impetus for arbitration throughout much of the
early-nineteenth century, comprising the largest single subject of dispute
in arbitration cases brought to court in Kentucky from 1780-1860.89 The
1797 and 1798 Acts, the Revised Statutes, and the form of the Revised
Statutes codified by the Code of Practice greatly encouraged the use of
arbitration to settle disputes through: (1) provisions for enforcement by the
court (section 1); (2) assumption that arbitrators would be able to decide
according to law (section 2); (3) award of power to arbitrators to subpoena
witnesses and compel cooperation (section 3); (4) provisions that upheld
and expanded the Act of 1797 concerning guardians (section 4); (5) statement that no award should be set aside on form alone (section 8); and (6) a
provision for arbitration settlement by Justices of the Peace (section 9).90
The fact that the Revised Statutes and later the Code of Practice sought to
uphold the longstanding system of arbitration in Kentucky is further evidenced by the case notes following the statutory provisions in the Code of
Practice, many of which explicitly affirmed the law's favorable attitude
toward arbitration as a means of dispute resolution. 9 1
Perhaps one reason for the strength of these provisions is the fact
that the bitterness over land-title disputes and the role of the lawyer in
their resolution remained strong in Kentucky throughout the first half of
the 19th century. 92 In 1849, there was a call for, and the holding of, a constitutional convention. In the debates surrounding that event, this antilawyer sentiment resurfaced, with men stating that the bar had
"'despoiled' the property of the early settlers of the State on behalf of
'land-jobbers' while themselves growing 'fat and sleek upon the litigation
and miseries of the farmer ... '93 Even during the convention itself, a
proposal was made to quiet all titles of claimants who had occupied their
land for seven years. 94 By the mid-1880s, Kentucky still had hundreds of
principles as heretofore" in the Revised Statutes to "No award shall be set aside for the want
of form, but courts shall have power over awards on equitable principles as heretofore" in
the Code of Practice. See REVISED STATUTES, supra note 85, at Ch. 8, § 8 and CODE OF
PRACrICE, supra note 87, at § 499.

89. Land claims formed the basis of dispute in 33 of 114 reviewed cases. Merchant disputes formed the basis of 8 cases, and an additional 31 cases addressed a variety of issues
including water rights, slave owners' property rights, and disputes over the formation of
turnpikes and railroads. Each of the remaining 42 cases did not provide enough information
in the opinion to determine the basis for dispute. See Table, supra note 64.
90. Sections cited are from the CODE OF PRACTICE. Supra note 87 at 205-06, § 499, Ch. 8,
Ti. 10.
91. Id. See case law notes included in the appendix to this source.
92. JAMES w. GORDON, LAWYERS INPOLITICS; MID-NNETEENTH CENTURY KENTUCKY AS A
CASE STUDY 152 (Garland Publishing, Inc., New York 1990).
93. Id. at 152. (citing Louisville Journal,26 October 1849).
94. Id. Gordon states here that the proposal failed and was not brought up again.
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thousands of acres of land whose ownership had not been recorded. 95
During this same time period, the Court of Appeals heard many arbitration appeals based on land-dispute claims. 96 Likely it was the legislative
language, instigated by land-dispute upheaval and applied by the court in
its arbitration decisions, that led the Kentucky Court of Appeals to be an
extremely pro-arbitration court throughout the antebellum era.
Horwitz's Case Law Conclusions As They Apply to Kentucky
The preceding discussion demonstrates a countervailing factor to
Horwitz's argument that arbitration across antebellum America was promoted, maintained, and then dissolved by the combined economic and
political interests of the merchants acting in concert with the judiciary.
That countervailing factor is social at its root. Essentially, Horwitz's history of arbitration's decline and the emerging legal system's triumph is a
95. SHALER, supra note 18, at 51. This continued dispute over Kentucky land claims
throughout the nineteenth century is also chronicled in the previously mentioned "Tenants of
the Log Cabin," GATES, supra note 55, at 13-47. A claimants' law was passed on Feb. 21,
1797 that gave the occupying settlers, if ejected, the value of their improvements and
charged them for any damages to the land. More occupancy laws followed and by 1820
Kentucky had created statutory enactments granting "the right of occupants with a color or
title to their improvements and the right of settlers on privately owned land, unchallenged
for seven years and paying taxes thereon, to a firm and clear title to their land no matter what
adverse titles might be outstanding." Id. at 27. During the Panic of 1819, Kentucky split over
debtor relief legislation with the Relief Party consisting of "debtors, several eminent
lawyers, and a large majority of the population" and the Anti-Relief Party consisting of "the
mercantile class, the lawyers and judges, and the larger farmers." Id. at 28-29. In response to
the Court of Appeals striking down a replevin law, the legislature abolished the court, and
replaced it with judges more favorable toward relief legislation. Then, in the case of Green
v. Biddle, 8 Wheaton 11 (1823), the United States Supreme Court found that the Kentucky
statutes on occupancy violated Article Seven of the Virginia-Kentucky compact. Kentucky
land claims were once more thrown into confusion. Governor Charles Scott and conservative
leaders in the legislature had questioned the constitutionality of the occupancy laws as had
many of the large property owners but the laws continually had been upheld by the
Kentucky Court of Appeals. The United States Supreme Court decision instigated great conflict. The Governor and the Legislature opposed the Court's decision and Kentucky secured
an (ultimately unsuccessful) rehearing of the case. It was believed that, "[b]y thus applying
the harsh doctrines of common law to the occupancy statutes of Kentucky, the [United States
Supreme] Court threatened to destroy all equity in improvements settlers had made on land
having prior claimants." Id. at 37. Kentucky did not accept the United States Supreme
Court's decision and in 1824 the Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the occupancy law of
1812 and said it was not inconsistent with the Virginia compact. Kentucky said that there
was no question that the Act of 1812 was constitutional and, subsequently, an 1824 act was
passed to undo Green and to uphold the rights of occupying settlers at the expense of absentee landowners. Absentee landowners liked Green and tried to take their cases to federal
courts for friendlier rulings but even there they did not receive much support. For the preceding discussion, see GATES, supra note 55, at 13-41.
96. Of 114 arbitration cases reviewed from 1780-1860, 33 (approximately 29%) revolved
around land-dispute claims. The actual percentage may be even higher given the fact that
disputes of 42 cases were not discernible. Of the 72 arbitration cases whose disputes were
discernable, 33 (approximately 46%) revolved around land-dispute claims. See Table, supra
note 64.
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story of revolution-a revolution in the use of arbitration that changed the
face of the American legal system. Horwitz believes this revolution came
about through the combined political interest of an emerging lawyer class
and the economic interests of an existing merchant class. But revolutions
occur for many reasons-political and economic, certainly, but social and
ideological as well. While Horwitz asserts a strong political and economic
foundation for the revolutionary decline of arbitration, it misses the mark
in an area, such as Kentucky, were unique social problems influenced
political and economic concerns in a way that prevented a merchantlawyer alliance and subsequent opposition to arbitration from forming in
the first place, at least in the antebellum period.
As demonstrated, arbitration in Kentucky was not primarily promoted
or sustained by the economic interests of the merchant classes, and it was
not demolished by the political motivations of an emerging lawyer class.
Instead, the continued favor and use of arbitration in Kentucky was social at
its root-the result of a state beleaguered by conflicting land-title claims.
One might suppose, at this point, that Horwitz's history of arbitration's
demise could play out through an alliance of the judiciary with land-title
disputants rather than with merchants. In order for such an alliance to occur,
however, Horwitz's portrait of the judicial branch as actively hostile to the
use of arbitration would also need to be accurate in Kentucky. Yet, no such
hostility emerges. To demonstrate this distinction, the following discussion
takes on each of the four claims Horwitz makes to support his account of a
judicial branch actively hostile to arbitration in antebellum America and
applies them to the arbitration case law in Kentucky at the time.
Decline in Common Law Deference to Arbitration Awards
One of Horwitz's first and most important claims is that at the turn of
the century courts began to abandon their common law deference to arbitration awards. 9 7 Under the common law of England, courts were
prohibited from intervening in arbitration awards, which were "conclusive,
unless some corruption, or other misbehavior of arbitrators, is proved...
."98 Horwitz claims that by the mid-1800s such deference was no longer
the norm and that "an increasingly self-conscious legal profession had suc99
ceeded in suffocating alternative forms of dispute settlement." One
example Horwitz provides is Pennsylvania, whose judiciary declared that it
would begin to set aside judgments upon "'a clear, plain, evident mistake,
either in law or fact, which affects the justice and honesty of the case,"'
and stated that it no longer considered arbitration to be "'a kind of judgment, given by private courts'... 'equally binding as a contract of the par100
ties, or a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction."'
97. HORWrrZ, supra note 1, at 150.
98. Id. at 154 (citing a note to Alken v. Bolan, 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 239, 240 (1803)).
99. Id. at 155.
100. Id. at 152 (citing Gross v. Zorger, 3 Yeates 521, 525, 526 (Pa. 1803) and Dixon v.
Morehead,Addison 216, 224 (Pa. 1794)).
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The case law of Kentucky does not support Horwitz's claim that by
the early nineteenth century the courts no longer deferred to arbitration
awards. 10 1 On the contrary, Kentucky case law demonstrates that the
court's deferential attitude toward arbitration awards prevailed through
the 1850s. From 1790-1810, the Kentucky Court of Appeals seemed to
treat arbitration as another, equal arm of the law. It overturned awards
when statutory formats had not been followed, but it did so in keeping
with the spirit and not the letter of the law. It never suggested that courts
were allowed to look into underlying facts or overturn an award unless
there was fraud or corruption on the face of the award.
The case of Baker's Heirs v. Crockett102 (1808) provides an example
of Kentucky's early favor toward both statutory and common law arbitration. Baker's Heirs was a land-dispute claim in which the disputing parties had agreed to send their dispute to arbitration. After the arbitration
award had been returned, a survey showed surplus land not contemplated
by the arbitrators. The court upheld the award under the existing arbitration statute and, in doing so, affirmed the common law process of arbitration. It stated:
By this view of the cases, as at common law, we may be greatly assisted in
respect of the proper effect and operation of the statute of this state, which
declares that an award under that act shall not be invalidated, or set aside, unless
it shall appear to the court, 'That such award was obtained by corruption, evident
partiality, or other undue means.'... We are, therefore, of opinion that either as
at common law, or in equity; with or without the statute; this award can not be set
03
aside for mistake of law, apparent in the body or face of the award.1

This early deference to the decisions of arbitrators continued
throughout the next decade and from 1811-1820 courts continued to
uphold arbitration under both common law and statutory law. In the 1811
101. To test the attitudes of the emerging legal system toward extrajudicial dispute resolution in Kentucky and New Jersey, I have relied heavily on cases dealing with extrajudicial
dispute resolution. I attempted to focus on cases stemming from these states' high courts of
law. For New Jersey, that included cases from the New Jersey Supreme Court. Since
Kentucky's state reporter system does not include cases from its high court of law in this
time period, I relied solely on cases reported in the Court of Appeals, Kentucky's court of
last resort for both law and equity. Since it was not always clear whether a given case was on
appeal from law or equity, I have attempted to include all relevant cases that made their way
to this court in this time period, whether law or equity. A Kentucky statute which broadly
upheld the validity of arbitration and arbitration awards contained a provision that allowed
courts of equity to retain their "power over awards, arbitraments or unipirages." (An Act
Concerning Awards, supra note 81, at § 6). New Jersey courts of equity also may have
retained a similar authority over arbitration. One would need to delve into New Jersey equity
case law to determine what impact such an authority may have had on the use of arbitration.
Unfortunately, equity case law from New Jersey's highest equity court is only available in
the New Jersey state reporter system from 1830 forward and, for equity opinions in New
Jersey's court of last resort, from 1847 forward.
102. 3 Ky. 396 (Ct. App. 1808).
103. Id. at 410-11. An award would not be enforced, however, if a party who submitted a
portion of land to arbitration had no authority over the land he submitted. Payne v. Moore, 5
Ky. 163 (Ct. App. 1810). These cases seem to be in keeping with Kentucky's need to settle
land disputes fully and finally.
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I0 4
the court stated that it
case of Ewing's Administrator v. Beauchamp,
was not up to courts to decide "whether in our opinion the arbitrators
105
Instead, courts were
determined correctly on the points before them."
only permitted to ask whether the arbitration demonstrated "either corruption, evident partiality, or other undue means" and if the arbitrators' determination "has been so palpably and grossly wrong, as to warrant this
court in pronouncing them to have acted corruptly, evidently partial, or
under other undue means within the meaning of a sound exposition of the
... 106 The court found that the arbitrators had not so acted and
law.
107
upheld the award.
In a later case, Ewing v. Beauchampl08 (1813), the court seemed not
only to maintain common law deference to awards but also to expand it.
The lower court had quashed the arbitration award for errors on the face
of the award. The Court of Appeals reversed and upheld the award, stating that although some had interpreted the common law from England as
allowing awards to be set aside if there was "a plain mistake in the body
of the award," Baker's Heirs had held that whether it was at common law
or pursuant to statute, an award could not be set aside for such a mistake. 109 Furthermore, the court believed that the arbitration award should
be as binding on the parties as a court judgment. For instance, in Irvine's
Heirs v. CrocketIlO (1816), the court upheld the arbitration award even
though the parties themselves had mutually agreed to set aside the award.
The court stated, "[T]he power is not given to vacate and set aside the
award and judgment of the court at the pleasure of the guardian
and adversary claimant. The judgment is made as binding as if it were
founded on the opinion of the court itself upon the merits of the
claims."l II
The cases where individuals wished to have their awards set aside
highlight the court's unwillingness to enter into areas that it deemed to be
under the arbitrators' jurisdiction. In several cases, the court outlined the
scope of that jurisdiction, preserving the arbitrators' independent authority
over the award before, during, and after the submission of the award. For
instance, in Gilkerson v. Flower11 2 (1809), the court held that it was
impermissible for a court to hear a matter in controversy while the arbitration on that matter was still pending. The court's decision in Singleton v.

104. 5 Ky. 456 (Ct. App. 1811).
105. Id. at 457. See also Williams v. Davis, 25 Ky. 533 (Ct. App. 1829) (award upheld in

spite of mistake of judgment by arbitrators).
106. 5 Ky. 456 at 458.
107. Id. at 458.
108. 6 Ky. 41 (Ct. of App. 1813).
109. Id. at 45. See also Clarke v. M'Kinney. 12 Ky. 195 (Ct. App. 1822) (award upheld in
spite of objections of fact).
110. Irvine's Heirs v. Crockett, 7 Ky. 437, 438 (Ct. App. 1816).

111. Id. at 438. See also Lillard v. Casey, 5 Ky. 459 (Ct. App. 1811) (court refused to set
aside award at request of one party after award was made a decree of the court).
112. 4 Ky. 524 (Ct. App. 1809).
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Mason] 13 (1810) highlighted the court's hesitancy to hear appeals from

awards.1 14 In other rulings, the court held several times that the authority
of the arbitrators over the matter in controversy pertained only to the parties who had agreed to the arbitration, 115 and ceased with the submission
of the award.116 This rule made sense, given the court's emphasis on party
agreement to arbitration and the fact that the controversy itself ceased to
exist once the award had been submitted. Thus, whether under common
law or statute, the arbitration award was to be as conclusive of the matters
in controversy as a court decision. In Evans v. M'Kinsey, 117 the court stated,

"...

it is well settled at common law, that after a submission to arbi-

trators, and an award in pursuance to the submission, no action can be
maintained on the original subject of the dispute ....118
In the 1820 case of Shackelford v. Purket,l19 the court further evidenced deference for arbitration by holding in a land-title case that,
113. 5 Ky. 165 (Ct. App. 1810). Similarly, the court refused to hear an action by one
party to compel the other party's performance of the award when the first party had not performed on the award as required. Fleming v. Chinowith, 2 Ky. 17 (Ct. App. 1801).
114. In Singleton, one party objected to the award after it was delivered to the court,
claiming that the lower court did not grant him adequate time to gather proof. The Court of
Appeals held that the objector should have brought an affidavit stating that his objections
"were probably true" in order to cause delay in the finality of the award. Since the affidavit
was not brought, the award was upheld.
115. These cases seem to apply to arbitration awards the general court rule that a decision
cannot bind individuals who were not parties to the suit. See Hay v. Cole, 50 Ky. 70 (Ct.
App. 1850) (award struck down because issued against a party not a plaintiff in the original
suit, which had been submitted to arbitration); Galloway's Heirs v. Hill, 7 Ky. 475 (Ct. App.
1816) (arbitration between Galloway's heirs and Hill struck down because the original suit
was between Hill and Galloway, not Hill and Galloway's heirs); Smith v. White, 40 Ky. 16
(Ct. App. 1840) (a wife who was not a party to the original suit could not be bound by the
award); Lemon v. Cherry, 4 Ky 253 (1808) (a principal will not be held to an award when he
did not give his agent authority to submit the dispute to arbitration); Waggener v. Bell, 20
Ky. 7 (Ct. App. 1826) (action of assumpit not permitted to discharge a claim against an individual not party to the arbitration and award). But see Keith v. Gore, 24 Ky. 8 (Ct. App.
1829) (in order to quiet title, a party in a land-dispute arbitration was assumed to represent
intermediate buyers prior to himself). Perhaps to provide certainty of intent to submit, the
court did require in one case the submission be by deed, and not by oral agreement, in specialty cases. Logsdon v. Roberts' Exec., 19 Ky. 255 (Ct. App. 1826).
116. See Martin v. Oneal, 12 Ky. 54 (Ct. App. 1822) (award can not be valid subsequent
to the original award since the arbitrators' authority ceased with the original award);
Lansdale v. Kendall, 34 Ky. 613 (Ct. App. 1836) (arbitrators can not issue awards subsequent to the original award or change the decision in their original award); Brown v.
Warnock, 35 Ky. 492 (Ct. App. 1837) (alterations to a submitted award will render the
award invalid if the alteration is of a material part and was conducted without consent of
both parties); Cleaveland v. Dixon, 27 Ky. 226 (Ct. App. 1830) (if one or more arbitrators
has had a change of opinion, the arbitrators must acquire the parties' consent before changing the award).
On a different jurisdictional issue, the court held that an order of reference could be set
aside when the referees refused to act and that the parties' consent must be acquired before
new referees could be appointed in their place. Adams v. Essex, 4 Ky. 149 (Ct. App. 1808).
117. 15 Ky. 262 (Ct. App. 1821).
118. Id.
119. 9 Ky. 435 (Ct. App. 1820).
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although the arbitration was performed, "in pursuance of no statutory
provision of this country, but was entered into by writing under the hands
and seals of the parties, without causing it to be made and order of the
20
court...." it would nevertheless be upheld as a common law arbitration.1
As a result, the award was put into "operation and effect.. .according to the
rules and principles of the common law."121 The court summarized by saying, "[t]hat, at common law, the award of arbitrators, regularly made, and
in relation to a matter which might be submitted, is conclusive between the
too
same parties in a contest involving the same matter, is a proposition
122
well settled to need illustration by the citation of authorities."
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals continued to defer to the decisions of arbitrators by
expressing support for common law arbitration,1 23 upholding awards in
spite of mistakes of law or fact,124 and striking down awards only when
there was evidence of fraudl 25 (especially in cases where evidence was
120. Id. at 438.
121. Id.
122. Id. For another example of court deference, see Brown v. East, 5 Ky. 405 (Ct. App.
1827) (court upheld a previous arbitration and award that had resolved part of a current controversy, regardless of the fact that the records had been lost.)
123. Frost v. Smith's Heirs, 30 Ky. 126, 127-128 (Ct. App. 1832).
124. As stated previously, in Baker's Heirs v. Crockett, 6 Ky. 41, 45 (Ct. App. 1808), the
court held that an award at common law or statute could not be set aside for a plain mistake
in the body of the award. See also Lillard v. Casey, 5 Ky. 459 (Ct. App. 1811) (a party to an
award can not resort to court because of an arbitrator mistake on legal issues or the admissibility of evidence). For more on evidence, see Offut v. Proctor,7 Ky. 252 (Ct. App. 1815)
(the fact that the arbitrators had heard evidence on matters not included in the submission
did not make the award void, even if the arbitrators exercised misjudgment in hearing the
evidence, since arbitrators had the power to decide what evidence was competent or relevant). The ability of arbitrators to determine what evidence they should hear was affirmed in
Harding v. Wallace, 47 Ky. 536 (Ct. App. 1848). Although, in 1829, the court in Callantv.
Downey, 25 Ky. 346, 348 (Ct. App. 1829) struck down an arbitration award for an evident
mistake on the face of the award, the court seemed to clarify its hesitancy to strike down
arbitration awards in the 1830 decision of Cleaveland v. Dixon, 27 Ky. 226 (Ct. App. 1830).
In Cleaveland, the court reaffirmed that an award would not be set aside for a mistake or a
misjudgment unless the mistake or misjudgment was clear on the face of the award and
operated to transform the award into something other than what the arbitrators had intended.
27 Ky. at 228. The protection here seems to be against the type of mistake that would transform the award itself into something the arbitrators themselves had not intended it to be. The
court used Cleaveland to delineate its position on mistakes in arbitration awards, citing the
previously mentioned cases of Baker's Heirs, Ewing v. Beauchamp, and Offut v. Proctor in
its statement that: "Arbitrators constitute a cheap domestic tribunal, chosen by the parties
themselves; and no appeal lies from their judgments. If they misjudge the law, or misconceive the facts, without any improper interference by either party, or any improper conduct
in themselves, their award can not be set aside merely for such misjudgment, or mistake
also, unless the award itself show the mistake; nor will a mistake, apparent on the face of the
award, be sufficient for setting it aside, unless it is of such a character as to show, that the
deduction of the arbitrators, was a mistaken inference from the facts, or that the facts themselves did not authorize the conclusion drawn from them, and, that therefore, the award is
not what the arbitrators intended that it should be." 27 Ky. at 228 (Ct. App. 1830).
125. In McCawley's Adm'x v. Brown's Adm'r, 51 Ky. 132 (Ct. App. 1851), the arbitration was struck down because of multiple issues where the arbitration had not been
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not heard by all arbitrators).126 The court stated explicitly that it was so
holding in order to avoid a scenario in which the arbitrations would "be
regarded more than useless; and settlements by parties themselves would
be idle and unavailing."1 27
In the late 1830s, the court not only continued its long-standing deference, but affirmed it explicitly, stating in Shockey's Administrator v.
Glasfordl28 (1837):
the mode of settling controversies by arbitration has, in modem times, become
peculiarly the favorite of the law, and the ancient niceties and technicalities
applied to it, have given away to a more rational and liberal construction, with a
view to encourage and sustain this mode of putting an end to litigation.

This was a trend that continued throughout the 1850s 129 with the
court in Overly's Executor v. Overly's Devisees130 (1858) stating, "the
statute of 1798, concerning awards, did not alter the common law of arbitration and award." The court went on to say:
There is nothing contained in the provisions of the Revised Statutes or of the
Code of Practice on this subject, which repeals the common law, or prohibits a
submission under an agreement of the parties. The manner in which controversies
may be submitted to arbitration, under an order or rule of court, so that the award
may be made the judgment of the court, is therein prescribed; but the common
law on the subject is not altered, nor are parties prohibited from submitting their
controversies to arbitration without the intervention of a court.t 131

Strict Construction of Arbitration Statutes and
Reversal on Technicalities
A second claim Horwitz makes is that courts showed their lack of
deference to arbitration awards by strictly construing arbitration statutes
conducted properly, and most notably, where the arbitrator did not have the proper authority
to act over an estate. See also Maysville. W., PI, & L., Turnpike Road Co. v. Waters. 36 Ky.
62 (Ct. App. 1837) (affirmed the overturning of an award in light of several issues, including
a claim that the award was made ex parte, a claim that one party was not given notice,
alleged bias of the arbitrator, mistakes of law and fact, and the fact that there had been no
request by the parties to submit the dispute to arbitration).
126. See Callant v. Downey, 25 Ky. 346, 348 (Ct. App. 1829) (award will not be upheld
where there is fraud); Hickey v. Grooms, 27 Ky. 124, 125-26 (Ct. App. 1830) (the fact that
evidence was heard by only one arbitrator resulted in "undue means" of settlement that was
fatal to the award); and Henderson v. Buckley, 53 Ky. 236 (Ct. App. 1853) (court held that
the arbitrators must all hear the evidence and act on the award together); Blanton v. Gale, 45
Ky. 260, 264 (Ct. App. 1845) (award fails because arbitration submitted to two arbitrators
but at least some evidence heard only by one); Morrison's Ex'rs v. Barnett's Comm'rs, 5
Ky. 270 (1811) (commissioners appointed by special statute to convey a piece of land must
act jointly to submit any controversies to arbitration).
127. Callant, 25 Ky. at 348.
128. 36 Ky. 9, 10 (Ct. App. 1837).
129. Carson v. Carson, 58 Ky. 434, 434 (Ct. App. 1858) (discussing arbitration under the
Civil Code of Practice, § 499, Subdivision 1); Carson v. Carson, 59 Ky. 96, 97 (Ct. App.
1859) (upholding common law arbitration).
130. 58 Ky. 117, 119 (Ct. App. 1858).
131. Id, at 117, 119-129.
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so as to strike down awards on mere technicalities. He cites
Massachusetts as an example. 132 While Horwitz states that this was one of
the ways in which courts worked to eliminate the use of arbitration,
Kentucky case law shows that the Kentucky statutes were actually applied
by the courts as the legislature had intended: to uphold arbitration.
As discussed previously, Kentucky courts regularly distinguished
between common law and statutory arbitration and were careful to adhere
to the intent of the legislature in applying the statutes. Such careful application was more likely to uphold an arbitration award than to strike it
down. Furthermore, the Kentucky courts not only refused to use the arbitration statutes to construe arbitration out of existence, they also refused
to deny the validity and legitimacy of arbitration awards achieved outside
of the statute through the common law. Thus, far from decreasing their
deference to arbitration awards, Kentucky courts increased their deference
by allowing arbitration under both the statute and the common law. And
far from searching for technicalities to dismiss arbitration awards, the
Kentucky courts often looked to the legislative intent to uphold even those
awards that did not fully comply with the technical details of the statute.
Kentucky courts refused to expand the technical requirements of the
statute in order to increase their ability to strike down arbitration awards
in several areas, including the selection of judges as arbitrators,1 33 failure
to provide notice to parties of the time and place of the arbitration or of
the entrance of the award as a judgment of the court, 13 4 awards that were
132. HORwrrz, supra note 1, at 151.
133. In Galloway's Heirs v. Webb, 3 Ky. 326 (Ct. App. 1808) the legislative act permitted parties to choose their arbitrators so the fact that the parties had chosen to have the
judges act as arbitrators was not fatal to the award.
134. Awards were invalidated on grounds of failure to provide notice when a party did
not have notice of the time and place of the arbitrators' meeting or if the party was not present at the making of the award. Craig v. Hawkins, 3 Ky. 46 (Ct. App. 1806). However,
Hopkins v. Sodouskie, 4 Ky. 148 (Ct. App. 1808) held that if a party was present at the judgment of the award, and did not voice an objection to lack of notice at that time, that party
lost the right to that objection as a result of his silent presence. Cleaveland v. Dixon, 27 Ky.
226 (Ct. App. 1830) reiterated this rule and Hardingv. Wallace, 47 Ky. 536 (Ct. App. 1848)
held that a party similarly lost that right if the party's attorney was present on the party's
behalf. Thus, in the notice cases, the court seemed to be acting not out of a desire to adhere
to formal notice requirements, but out of a desire to protect parties against the possibility of
fraud conducted in their absence. Wrigglesworth v. Morton, 5 Ky. 157, 161-63 (Ct. App.
1810), in which the court upheld an arbitration award even when parties were not present for
the writing out of the award, supports this interpretation. In Wrigglesworth, the court said
that if both parties were present for all of the law and evidence portions of the arbitration, as
long as each party acquired a copy of the award at least fifteen days before judgment on the
award as required by statute, then the fact that the parties were not present for the actual
writing out of the award would not be fatal. The implication is that the parties were present
to view any wrongful conduct and had notice, under the fifteen days requirement, of the time
that the award would be entered as a judgment of the court and could therefore be present to
view the final award at that time. Following the language of the Code of Practice, the court
came to view this time requirement even less strictly in later years. Carson v. Carson, 58
Ky. 434, 436 (Ct. App. 1858). Continuing its desire to adhere to purpose over technicalities
of notice, the court stated that the fact that a party had an award was prima facie evidence
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broader than the original items submitted for arbitration, 135 arbitrators'
that it had been delivered to him by the arbitrators as their award Lansdale. Kendall, 34 Ky.
613 (Ct. App. 1836). The court took their notice holdings even further by stating that, even if
the copy of the award was not delivered to a party at all, that would only be cause for nonjudgment if the party who did not receive the copy was at no fault or neglect in the fact that
he did not receive a copy. Thus, a party was not allowed to cry fraud as the result of his own
misconduct. Neither was a party allowed to avoid payment of the award on grounds that the
award had stated no time payment for the payment; the court in Slack v. Price, 4 Ky. 272
stated that if not time frame for payment was stated in the award, then payment was due as
soon as the award was made. Although Saunders v. Throckmorton, 2 Ky. 324 (Ct. App.
1804), held that an award would be void if it did not appear on its face that the arbitrators had
agreed to meet at a certain time and place, the later case of Keans v. Rankin, 5 Ky. 88 (Ct.
App. 1810) seemed to dispense with that rule, with the court holding that the law did not
require that the face of the award show that the parties had notice of the place and time that
the award would be made. This later rule was upheld in Shockey's Administrator v. Glasford,
36 Ky. 9, 13 (Ct. App. 1837), in which the court reiterated that the technical requirement for
notice was dispensed with if both parties agreed to meet at a certain time and place for the
arbitration and actually did meet and go through with the arbitration. For holdings regarding
the fifteen days requirement, see Shult v. Travis, 2 Ky. 140 (Ct. App. 1802) (held that delivery of the award was not required by the law); Phillips v. Travis, 2 Ky. 174 (Ct. App. 1802)
(upheld the fifteen days rule as required by statute and thus struck down an award submitted
after only nine days, stating that the full fifteen days was required to insure that a party would
have the ability to make objections to the award prior to judgment); Keans v. Rankin, 5 Ky.
88 (Ct. App. 1810) (award upheld even though judgment was made before fifteen days had
passed because the parties had agreed to return award for judgment within the current term);
Middleton v. Hume, 26 Ky. 221 (Ct. App. 1830) (judgment can be entered before the fifteen
days have passed only if both parties are in court, agree to have the judgment entered, and
have waived their objections); Harding v. Wallace, 47 Ky. 536 (Ct. App. 1848) (even if
copies of the award are not delivered at all, that is only a ground for continuance, not a
ground for invalidation of the award); Adams v. Hammon, 49 Ky. 5 (Ct. App. 1849) (judgment cannot be entered in the same term in which the award was sent to arbitration unless the
parties are given copies 15 days prior to judgment). However, in cases where the court did
set aside an order of reference, it made clear that objections to setting aside the order had to
be made at that time the order was set aside or that such objections would be effectively
waived (Trigg v. Shield, 3 Ky. 176 (1807); Casky v. January, 3 Ky. 549 (1808)).
135. The general rule here seems to be to uphold the award insofar as it pertains to matters that were stated in the declaration of controversies. For instance, Curd v. Wallace, 37
Ky. 190, 194 (Ct. App. 1838) cites the proposition that only those matters submitted would
be upheld but that an arbitration award that encompassed more than what was submitted
would not make the award fatal in its entirety but would only make the award void as to
those items not submitted. See also Grimes v. Grimes, 31 Ky. 234, 234 (Ct. App. 1833)
(statute requires that the parties state what disputes they are referring to the arbitrators);
Smith v. Cutrights,2 Ky. 145 (Ct. App. 1802) (the subject in controversx was "so imperfectly and defectively stated in the submission" and "the arbitrators have awarded upon matters
which by no legal intendment, can be within the submission" that the award was set aside);
Blunt v. Sprowl, 2 Ky. 227 (Ct. App. 1803) (awards must contain a declaration of the nature
of the controversy); Turpin v. Banton, 2 Ky. 312 (Ct. App. 1808) (an award not declaring the
matters in controversy was void for uncertainty); Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 3 Ky. 227 (Ct.
App. 1808) (award must contain a declaration of controversies); Emerson v. Hutcheson, 5
Ky. 455 (Ct. App. 1811) (award must contain a declaration of controversies). The court also
struck down awards that determined matters not outlined in the declaration of controversies.
See Carmack v. Grant, 15 Ky. 32 (Ct. App. 1824) (award invalid because it considered rent
payments subsequent to the judgment on the award which were not in the declaration of controversies); Brown v. Warnock, 35 Ky. 492 (Ct. App. 1837) (entire award was struck down
because to omit the item that was not declared would be to destroy the mutuality of the
award); and Sthreshly v. Broadwell, 24 Ky. 340 (1829) (award struck down because the
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use of umpires,] 36 awards entered by fewer arbitrators than those to which
the controversy had originally been submitted, 137 voidness for uncertainty, 13 8 and the submission of a dispute to arbitration as a bar to further
articles referred only to the ownership of a female slave, who then died before submission,
and the subsequent award dealt only with ownership of the female slave's child). It is important to note, however, that the court did not strike down awards simply because the arbitrators
had considered, but not determined, matters that fell outside the declaration of controversies.
Cleaveland v. Dixon, 27 Ky. 226 (Ct. App. 1830). In addition, in Engleman's Executors v.
Engleman, 31 Ky. 437, 439 (Ct. App. 1833), the court stated that it should be assumed that all
parts of a claim had been submitted to the arbitrators. Furthermore, in the later case of Newton
v. West, 60 Ky. 24, 25 (Ct. App. 1860), the court took a more liberal view of submission
statements. Newton and West had dismissed their court suit and referred the matter to arbitrators. west challenged the award, stating that it was broader in scope than those matters the
parties had submitted to the arbitrators. The court upheld the award, stating that since the parties' law suit would have encompassed all matters, and the arbitration was submitted to in
place of the law suit, then the arbitration could encompass all matters as well.
136. The court in Daniel v. Daniel'sAdministrator, 36 Ky. 98, 98-100 (Ct. App. 1838)
struck down an award because the two arbitrators chose an umpire to settle the case but had
no authority to do so since the arbitration had been referred not to the umpire, but to the two
arbitrators. However, in Tyler v. Webb, 49 Ky. 123 (Ct. App. 1849), the same court later
stated that when two parties had submitted their disputes to two referees and an umpire, it
was permissible that the award be decided by all, even though the job of the umpire was
only to step in if the referees disagreed, because "it would seem to be, in such cases, perfectly consistent with the intention and understanding of the parties, that the arbitrators with the
assistance and approbation of the umpire should make the award, and that being made jointly by them all, it was done in exact conformity with the views and intention of the parties to
the submission .... . The distinction here may hinge on what the court considers to be the
intention of the parties in choosing who will arbitrate their dispute. See also Keans v.
Rankin, 5 Ky. 88 (Ct. App. 1810). Additionally, in Newton v. West, 60 Ky. 24, 26 (Ct. App.
1860), the court held that there could be no objection to the fact that the arbitrators chose an
umpire before they needed him because it was more convenient to have the umpire there to
hear all of the evidence from the start and the umpire properly acted within his sphere of
duties as an umpire.
137. The court upheld the notion that the award should be determined and made by all of
the arbitrators to whom the parties had submitted their disputes, but it did not go out of its
way to invalidate such awards. For instance, the court in Patten v. Collins, 2 Ky. 153 (Ct.
App. 1802) invalidated an award made by three arbitrators when the submission had been to
four arbitrators with no acknowledgment in the submission that the parties had agreed that
he award could be made by less than four. However, in Massie v. Spencer, 11 Ky. 320 (Ct.
App. 1822), the dispute was submitted to three arbitrators. The arbitrators returned the
award. Later, one arbitrator stated that he had not agreed with the award, that the award had
only been made by the other two, and that he had thought that an award of the majority was
permissible under law. The court upheld the award, stating, "after an award is delivered as
an award of all [three], its legal effect ought never to be overturned by the introduction of
parol evidence, to show that the award was made through a misconception of law in the arbitrators." Id. at 322.
138. The court seemed to distinguish between awards that clearly left the parties in a state
of uncertainty as to performance and therefore should not be upheld and awards on which
performance could occur. For instance, in Orear v. Singleton, 2 Ky. 65 (Ct. App. 1801), the
court held an award void for uncertainty because it required: (1) one party to relinquish a
portion of a tract of land but did not say how that portion was to be determined, and (2) that
same party to make a payment but did not say at what time interest would begin to be calculated. See also Cox v. Smyth, 3 Ky. 420 (Ct. App. 1808) where an award in a land dispute
was not enforced because the absence of a survey left the land designations uncertain. In
contrast, the court repeatedly held that awards that granted costs to one party were certain
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action. 139 The statutory requirement that arbitrators be sworn in before
making an award provides an interesting example of an area in which the
court adhered to a more technical requirement, questioned the strictness of
that requirement, and then looked for ways in which it could presume
compliance with that requirement, despite the absence of explicit lan140
guage that the requirement had been met.
since the court determined the costs. Short v. Kincaid, 4 Ky. 420 (Ct. App. 1809); Cartwright v. Trumbo, 8 Ky. 359 (Ct. App. 1818); Harding v. Wallace, 47 Ky. 536 (Ct. App.
1848). But see Brown v. Warnock, 35 Ky. 492 (Ct. App. 1837), which held that an award for
costs is certain but will be void if the costs were not ascertained. This case seems to be an
outlier since, in the later case of Cloud v. Hughes, 42 Ky. 375 (Ct. App. 1843), the court
went out of its way to say that an award that gave costs was final even if it did not settle who
should pay the costs since costs in arbitration awards follow the same pattern as costs in jury
verdicts. Emphasizing its commitment to upholding awards, the court stated, "An award
which is specially favored by the law, in modem times, ought not to be set aside on such
slight grounds."
139. See Gore v. Chadwick, 36 Ky. 477 (Ct. App. 1838) (holding a general bar to suits
but stating that the suit was not barred in this instance because the agreement to submit to
arbitration came after action had already commenced), Engleman's Executors v. Engleman,
31 Ky. 437, 438 (Ct. App. 1833) (stating that even a parol submission and award were a bar
to the instant suit). The court did, however, go on to suggest that items that were in dispute
between the parties but not part of the arbitration submission could be brought to court to be
resolved. See Davidson v. Davidson, 49 Ky. 115, 116 (Ct. App. 1849). But see Danville,
Lancaster, and Nicholasville Turnpike Road Company v. Stewart, 59 Ky. 119, 120-21 (Ct.
App. 1859) (holding that a party could not object after trial that a reference had been set
aside before the trial when he did not object at the time that it was set aside); Peters'
Administrator v. Craig, 36 Ky. 307, 308 (Ct. App. 1838) (stating that a submission was not
binding where there was no evidence that the parties had agreed to be bound by the submission and a suit was brought the day after the arbitration, before the award could have been
made and completed. The court stated that this was a permissible revocation of the award
because it occurred before the award was conclusively made); Dorsey's Representatives v.
Dorsey, 30 Ky. 156, 157 (Ct. App. 1832) (court heard a dispute between a divorcing couple,
ordered arbitration for the disputes remaining between the parties but then, at the next term
of court, set aside the arbitration and continued handling the matter in court).
140. The requirement that arbitrators be sworn in changed dramatically over time. The
statute required that arbitrators take an oath, which the courts initially read to require evidence on the face of the award attesting to the fact that the arbitrators had actually been
swom in. Jackson v. Steele, 2 Ky. 21 (Ct. App. 1801) (award invalidated because it did not
show that the arbitrators had been sworn in before making the award); Blunt v. Sprowl, 2 Ky.
227 (Ct. App. 1803) (fact that arbitrators were sworn in has to appear on the face of the
award); French v. Moseley, 11 Ky. 247, 249-50 (Ct. App. 1822) (arbitrators' first award did
not demonstrate that the arbitrators had been swom in but an amended second award attesting to the swearing in actually went to court and was thus upheld). However, in the 1810
case of Lile v. Barnett, 5 Ky. 166 (Ct. App. 1810), the court stated a desire to remove this
requirement: "If this question [of swearing in] were a new one, there would be great propriety in contending for the principle, that the arbitrators ought to be presumed to have done
that which was only necessary to their right acting, but did not form a part of the award
itself, unless the contrary was shown. But we conceive the question too long settled by the
decisions of this Court, to be now stirred by us-Bice v. Smock, decided October term,
1798--Shult v. Travis, Pr. Dec., 163-Blunt et ux. v. Sprawl et ux., Pr. Dec., 267." Unable to
presume swearing in in general, the court moved to presume several aspects of the swearing
in. For instance, in several cases, the court held that if the award showed that the arbitrators
were sworn in, then it would be presumed that it was done in the proper way. See Keans v.
Rankin, 5 Ky. 88 (Ct. App. 1810); Aills v. Voirs, 8 Ky. 190 (Ct. App. 1818); Shryock v.
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The Court of Appeals seemed less inclined to uphold awards where
important items were not included in the record,141 the case was extremely complex,1 42 or the matter was "wholly uncertain, undetermined, and
open for future controversy."1 43 Nevertheless, in the late 1820s, the court
explicitly discouraged the use of technicalities to overturn awards, stating:
It is not fitting that courts should be punctiliously exact, or fastidiously technical
in the interpretation of awards by arbitrators. Arbitrations are comparatively
cheap and speedy. They are favored by the law; and, in modem times, awards
have received more indulgence and liberality than were extended to them
anciently. They will be construed according to the dictates of common sense.
Their words will generally be interpreted according to the popular understanding
of them. In construing them, the only object of the judge, is to ascertain what the
1 44
arbitrators intended.

This same proposition was echoed 30 years later when the court in
Snyder v. Rousel45 (1859) summarized the court's stance on technical

defeats of arbitration awards, stating:
Mere formal objections to awards should be disregarded. The settlement of controversies by arbitration is favored by law, and should be encouraged by sustaining awards, notwithstanding they may be liable to technical46and formal objections, which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.]

Thus, the 1780-1860 case law of Kentucky does not reveal a judiciary actively hostile to arbitration and seeking to overturn awards on purely
technical terms.
Morton, 9 Ky. 561 (Ct. App. 1820). In addition, the court held that, in a case where evidence
was heard by arbitrators but no award was issued, the court would presume that the arbitrators had been sworn in and that the evidence could be properly submitted before the court.
See Kelly's Executor v. Connell 's Administratix, 33 Ky. 432 (Ct. App. 1835). Finally, in
Snyder v. Rouse, 58 Ky. 625 (Ct. App. 1859), the court upheld arbitration in a case where the
arbitrators were not sworn.
141. In Milner v. Turner's Heirs, 20 Ky. 240 (Ct. App. 1827) the court held that arbitrators should include all that they looked at in determining the award. Because the submission
to arbitration was not included in the record, and a record of certain items was lacking, the
arbitration was not upheld.
142. In M'Clanahan'sDevisees v. Kennedy, 24 Ky. 332, 336 (Ct. App. 1829), the court
sent a land inheritance dispute to court against decedent's instructions for arbitration due to
the great numbers of parties involved and the expected complexity of resolving the case.
Brooks v. Clay, 5 Ky. 499 (1811) may also be such a case. In Brooks, the parties attempted
an arbitration five years into what would become a fifteen-year dispute over land. The court
set aside the order of reference during the thirteenth year of the dispute, but provided no reasons in the Court of Appeals record and listed no objections by either party.
143. Citing McCullough v. Myers's Ex'rs., 3 Ky. 206, 209 (Ct. App. 1808), in which an
award was set aside because it was "not sealed, as expressly required by the submission, and
because it leaves the matter wholly uncertain, undetermined, and open for future controversy." The court showed a pro-arbitration bent, however, when it said that if the parties had
agreed to the award, it would have been upheld even without the seal. See also Coghill v.
Hord, 31 Ky. 350 (Ct. App. 1833), in which the court found that an award was uncertain
because it was based on the value of the property in question but did not provide for a means
to determine the value of that property.
144. Gentry v. Barnet, 25 Ky. 312, 315 (Ct. App. 1829).
145. 58 Ky. 625 (Ct. App. 1859).
146. Id. at 626-27.
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Refusal to Refer on Questions of Law
A third trend Horwitz points to in his discussion of arbitration's
decline at the turn of the century was the courts' new refusal to refer cases
involving questions of law to arbitration. Horwitz cites De Hart v.
Covenhaven, 14 7 (1801) in which the New York court asserted that it
would no longer refer any case to an arbitrator if the case might have a
question of law. Horwitz states that "[w]ith this decision, the judges had
finally established their position as the sole and authoritative expositors of
New York law." 148 He continues, "Thereafter, up through the time of the
Civil War, arbitration in New York was confined to fact finding, and referees were required to follow judicially established rules. In short, during
the first few decades of the nineteenth century, both juries and arbitrators
49
were deprived of their prerevolutionary shares of lawmaking power."1
Unlike the courts in Horwitz's history of New York, the Kentucky
courts continued to refer decisions to arbitrators on issues of both fact and
law, and arbitrators were seen as legitimately able to decide either.
Arbitrators were given authority to determine cases among parties along
150
the same lines that those cases could have been decided under the law.
Furthermore, it did not invalidate the award if the arbitrators had made a
mistake in the interpretation of that law. For instance, in 1810, the court in
Wrigglesworth v. Morton cited previous case law when stating that an
arbitration award "cannot be set aside for mistake of law, apparent in the
body or face of the award."lSl This deference to the arbitrators on questions of law continued even when the parties contended that the law was
147. De Hart v. Covenhoven, 2 Johns. Cas. 402 (N.Y. 1801). In De Hart, the counsel for
the plaintiff moved to have the case submitted to reference. The counsel for the defendant
provided an affidavit that stated that the case involved questions of law. The per curiam
opinion of the court stated: "As the trial will involve the decision of law questions, the
motion must be denied." De Hart,2 Johns. Cas. At 402.
148. HoRwrrz, supra note 1, at 150 (citing Adams v. Bayles, 2 Johns. 374 (N.Y. 1807);
Low v. Hallett, 3 Cai. R. 82 (N.Y. 1805)).
149. Id. at 150 (citing C. Edwards, The Law and Practiceof Referees 17-18 (1860)).
150. One area in which this was demonstrated was in the ability or inability of arbitrators
to convey land. In Dicken v. Griffith, 23 Ky. 605, 607 (Ct. App. 1828), the court held that if
the action submitted was one of ejectment, then conveyance of land could not be a part of
the award since "the ejectment itself could not enforce such a measure, nor was such a matter in controversy." The court held that the arbitrators could rightfully convey lands in other
areas in keeping with the law. In the later case of Brown v. Burkenmeyer, 39 Ky. 159, 16063 (Ct. App. 1839), the court affirmed the "conveyance of the lease hold, as awarded by the
arbitrators," stating that whether under an agreement or an award, "[tihe same moral obligation to convey, if the award was fairly made," exists. In Stark's Heirs v. Cannady, 13 Ky.
399 (Ct. App. 1823), the court also held that verbal submissions to settle land disputes were
permissible if the verbal agreement regarding the land would be permissible under the
statute of frauds. This principle of granting arbitrators the same powers as permitted under
the law was further demonstrated by the court in Evans v. M'Kinsey, 15 Ky. 262 (Ct. App.
1821), in which the court held that, "In all cases where writing is not required to transfer the
title of the thing in contest, a parol submission and award is as valid as a written one."
151. 5 Ky. 157, 161 (Ct. App. 1810).
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handled wrongly. For instance, in Ewing v. Beauchamp152 (1813), the
court reviewed the history of deference on questions of law and chose to
uphold deference, stating:
Whether the arbitrators misjudged the law in their decision between the parties,
we deem not necessary to be examined: for it is conceived from the act of 1798,
concerning awards, no award should ever be set aside or invalidated on the
ground of the misjudgment of the arbitrators .... It is evident that the misjudgment of the arbitrators in a point directly in issue between the parties, and submitted to them for their decision, is not embraced by the act as a cause for which the
award can be invalidated. To permit such a construction would in effect defeat
the salutary provisions of the law. For if because the court may think the law different from what the arbitrators have decided, they will quash an award, in every
case where an issue of law is submitted the award cannot finally and certainly
decide the controversy, but only place the cause in a different attitude for the
decision of the court on the point of law. The parties thereby would be effectually
precluded from having the benefit of a final decision of their cause, by judges of
their own choosing, although the award may be made fairly, without corruption
or partiality or other undue means.

Perhaps the best evidence for the proposition that the judiciary
upheld the right of arbitrators to determine issues of law is Rudd v.
Jones153 (1836). In Rudd, two merchants entered into a dispute over payment of goods. Jones sued in court for payment and a verdict was
returned. Neither party liked the verdict so they agreed to "set aside by
consent." 154 They then referred their controversy to arbitration. When the
arbitrators found for Jones, Rudd filed to enjoin the judgment on the basis
of "alleged partiality and fraud." 155 The court upheld the arbitration
award, finding "no proof of misconduct or partiality" and stating that
"[t]he award does not exhibit, on its face, any evidence of miscalculation
or mistake." 1 56 The court said:

The parties having made the arbitrators judges between them, mere erroneousness in their judgment will not be sufficient for reversing or vacating the award.
As to judgment respecting the law of the case submitted, they were the ultimate
tribunal ....the arbitrators had the right to decide the question of law for themselves; and even though they may have decided erroneously, their judgment is
57

final. 1

Thus, as case law demonstrates, throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the Kentucky courts upheld the right of arbitrators to
determine questions of law, consciously recognizing that, by doing so,
they were upholding the jurisdiction of arbitrators and the legitimacy and
finality of arbitration awards.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

6 Ky. 41, 45 (Ct. of App. 1813).
34 Ky. 229, 230-31 (Ct. App. 1836).
Id. at 229.
Id. at 229-230.
Id. at 231.
157. Id. at 229, 231.
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Merchants' Lack of Deference Signaling Court Victory Over
Arbitration
Horwitz asserts that the merchants' increasing appeals of arbitration
awards were evidence of the New York courts' success "in reversing the
colonial pattern of merchants' deference to these awards."1 58 This trend
does not apply to Kentucky. Contrary to Horwitz's suggestion that the
courts were trying to break down internal deference to the awards, the
Kentucky courts continued to uphold arbitration awards on appeal, even
in cases involving merchants. In upholding these arbitration awards, the
Kentucky courts seemed to suggest a desire to strengthen deference to
awards.
For instance, in Southard v. Steelel 59 (1826), the court declined an
opportunity to strike down a merchant award when it used persuasive
precedent on an original question to hold that a merchant could bind his
co-partner in a submission and award. This arbitration was upheld in spite
of the fact that A Petitionfor a Rehearing on the Merits, filed by F.W.S.
Grayson, Esq., and included in the opinion, decried this decision, incorporating much of the anti-arbitration language and sentiment Horwitz speaks
of in his work.160 Three years later, in Gentry v. Barnetl61 (1829), two
merchants agreed to submit all of their disputes except one to arbitration.
When one party sued for performance of the award, the case went to
court, and the Court of Appeals upheld the award.
Rudd v. Jones162 (1836) provides an excellent example. As stated
previously, Rudd involved a dispute between two merchants who first
received a verdict from court and then mutually agreed to submit to arbitration. When the arbitration award was returned for Jones, Rudd sued.
The court upheld the arbitration award as binding on the parties, stating
that they could not strike down the award "without shaking the stability of
judicial awards, and subverting the long and well established doctrines of
the law respecting their validity and effect."1 63 Even as late as 1860, the
court continued this trend by upholding the few arbitration agreements
engaged in between merchants that made their way to court. 164
158. HORwrrz, supra note 1, at 150.
159. 19 Ky. 435, 438 (Ct. App. 1826).
160. Southard, 19 Ky. at 435, 438, 441-46.
161. 25 Ky. 312 (Ct. App. 1829).
162. 34 Ky. 229, 230 (Ct. App. 1836).
163. Id. at 229, 232.
164. See Newton v. West, 60 Ky. 24, 25 (Ct. App. 1860). As stated previously, disputants
Newton and West agreed to dismiss their court suit and use arbitration instead. After the
arbitration award was granted, West challenged it, saying that it was too broad in scope. The
Court of Appeals upheld the award, stating that because the lawsuit would have encompassed all matters, and the arbitration was submitted to in place of the lawsuit, then the arbitration could encompass all matters. Merchant disputes accounted for only 8 of 114 of
Kentucky's total disputes and 8 of 72 of Kentucky's known disputes in arbitration from
1780-1860. See Table, supra note 64.
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Conclusion to the Kentucky Account
Horwitz begins his account of the revolutionary triumph of law over
arbitration from 1780-1860 based on a general theme of lawyer-merchant
conflict, the increase and then decrease of the use of arbitration by the
merchant class, the merchants' alliance with the legal community to overthrow arbitration, and the judiciary's use of statutory law to defeat arbitration awards. Horwitz claims that the judiciary, in defeating those awards,
abandoned its common law deference to arbitration, began reversing on
technicalities, refused to refer matters of law, and triumphed through the
merchants' growing use of appeals. Each of these claims assumes a politically jealous judiciary that was hostile to the use of arbitration.
Yet, these claims do not apply to Kentucky, where existing social
factors caused arbitration to gain, not lose, favor throughout the antebellum period. Kentucky was an agricultural state that remained embroiled in
land-dispute claims throughout most of the nineteenth century. It was this
conflict over land claims, and not a mercantile animosity toward pre-commercial lawyers, that seemed to fuel the need for and use of arbitration in
antebellum Kentucky. Furthermore, Kentucky hosted a judiciary that,
throughout the mid-nineteenth century, was extremely reluctant to overturn both common law and statutory arbitration awards. The Kentucky
judiciary exhibited this attitude by focusing on intent rather than technicalities, continuing to refer matters of law, and generally supporting the
use of arbitration as a valid and long-favored form of extrajudicial dispute
resolution. The Court of Appeals' decision in Overly's Executor v.
Overly's Devisees1 65 (1858) provides a good summary of where the
Kentucky judiciary stood with respect to arbitration at the close of the
antebellum period:
In modern times the submission of controversies to arbitration has been much
more encouraged than it was anciently. It has been the policy of the law to favor
the settlement of disputes in this manner. It is attended with much less expense
than the ordinary litigation in courts of justice, and is just as likely to result in a
correct determination of the matters in controversy between the parties. Acts
have been passed by the legislature for its encouragement, by permitting the parties to proceed under an order of court, so that the award, when made, could be
entered as the judgment of the court, instead of compelling the parties, as at com-

mon law, to resort to an action for a failure to perform it....
A mere error of
166
arbitrators, either as to law or fact, is no ground for setting aside their award.

165. 58 Ky. 117, 120-22 (Ct. App. 1858).
166. Id. (citing Rudd v. Jones, 34 Ky. 229 (Ct. App. 1836)). Overly's case also expanded
the common law use of arbitration by executors. At common law, an executor could submit
a dispute regarding the estate of his ward but would be personally liable for the result.
Therefore, he was "compelled in self-defense" to choose court instead. The Overly court
stated that under the Code of Practice, a good faith submission by a decedent's personal representative would be binding and that the representative would not be personally responsible
for any loss "unless the same be caused by his fault or neglect." 58 Ky. 117, 120-21. The
court went on to say that there "does not seem to be any good reason" why this should not be
extended to out-of-court submission as well. Id. at 121. The court said that
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NEW JERSEY
The Kentucky account highlights the fact that Horwitz's thesis of a
merchant-lawyer alliance that effectively discouraged the use of extrajudicial dispute resolution and a judiciary hostile to extrajudicial dispute resolution does not ring true for Kentucky, where the existing social factor of
extensive land disputes worked to promote arbitration throughout the
antebellum era.
It would be incomplete, however, to end the inquiry there. While
Horwitz's account focuses mainly on an alliance of the lawyer and merchant classes, he also looks at another significant class of persons whom
he believes contributed to the initial rise and ultimate decline in the use of
arbitration: the Pennsylvania Quakers. In order to explore how Horwitz's
account pertains to the role of the Quakers in the rise and fall of arbitration in antebellum America, I have chosen to look at the use of arbitration
in New Jersey, a state that, like Pennsylvania, was heavily impacted by
the Quaker influence.
In order to consider the applicability of Horwitz's thesis to Quaker
New Jersey, we will first look at the historical context of Pennsylvania
and New Jersey.
Horwitz's Account of Extrajudicial Dispute Resolution and
Quaker Influence in Pennsylvania
Horwitz' s Pennsylvania account differs from his general account of
antebellum arbitration in that he includes the role of Quaker antilegalism
as a catalyst for early use of arbitration in that state. 167 Thus, in describing
what he sees as the rise and fall of arbitration in antebellum Pennsylvania,
Horwitz looks particularly at the influence of Pennsylvania's large Quaker
population. 16 8
Horwitz asserts that Quakers were very supportive of the use of arbitration. Quaker doctrine required Christians to avoid settling disputes
through the law and, instead, to settle their differences by submitting the
dispute to fellow Quaker arbitrators.169 Horwitz sums up the Quaker attialthough the form of common law arbitration and statutory arbitration under a rule of the
court may differ, there is not such a "substantial difference" between them that "the ends of
justice will be better promoted by one mode of proceeding than by the other." Id. at 121.
Note, however, that the Overly's court then begrudgingly remanded the award on the basis
that the statute requires an affidavit and, though the court would have been willing to waive
the requirement if the intent of the requirement had been met through information cited in
the record, no information was found and, therefore, in spite of the fact that "it is obvious
that the failure to require the claimant to verify his demand by affidavit was a mere oversight
on the part of the executor.... [the] judgment is affirmed." 58 Ky. at 122.
167. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 151.
168. Id. at 151-54.
169. Id. at 151 (citing 2 T. CLARKSON, A PORTRAITURE OF QUAKERISM 56 (Phila. 1808)).
This was a weighty doctrine, with its roots in St. Paul's charge to the church in Corinth:
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tude toward arbitration and lawsuits by citing Quaker historian Thomas
Clarkson as saying that, to the Quaker way of thinking,
[lI]aw-suits are at best tedious. They often destroy brotherly love in the individuals, while they continue. They excite also, during this time, not infrequently,
a vindictive spirit, and lead to family-feuds and quarrels. They agitate the
mind also, hurt the temper, and disqualify a man for the proper exercise of his
devotion. 170

The Quakers' pro-arbitration attitude began in pre-colonial times. In
England, Quakers had developed a set of rules for settling disputes
through the use of arbitration with an accompanying discipline for those
who first submitted their differences to the legal system instead. 171 This
extended to the colonies and, in the 1600s, Pennsylvania Quakers created
a system by which three or four Quakers would serve as "'common
72
peacemakers"' and sit on arbitration boards to resolve citizen disputes.1
Even as late as 1790, referees accounted for the administration of justice
73

in a great number of Pennsylvania disputes.1
After describing the Quakers' initial support and promotion of arbitration in Pennsylvania, Horwitz states that, even in the large Quaker state
of Pennsylvania, "there is strong evidence, similar to that in other states,
74
of increased judicial resistance to extrajudicial resolution of disputes."1
Thus, Pennsylvania was caught between two forces: the Quakers who
supported and promoted arbitration and a judiciary that increasingly
resisted it. As the judiciary grew increasingly hostile, the legislature
sought to limit the powers of arbitration by passing more restrictive arbi75
tration statutes that the judiciary then took care to interpret strictly.1
Thus, Horwitz asserts it was the Quakers who led to the original rise in
the use of arbitration but the hostile Pennsylvania judiciary, acting at
times in concert with the legislature, which fatally undermined the use of
arbitration in Pennsylvania.17 6 It is my conclusion that, although New
Jersey also has a Quaker foundation, Horwitz's history of Pennsylvania
does not play out in New Jersey.
"Dare any of you having a matter against another, go to law before the unjust, and not before
the saints?...If then ye have judgments of things pertaining to this life, set them to judge who
are least esteemed in the church. I speak to your shame. Is it so, that there is not a wise man
among you? [N]o, not one that shall be able to judge between his brethren? But brother goeth
to law with brother, and that before the unbelievers. Now therefore there is utterly a fault
among you, because ye go to law one with another. Why do ye not rather take wrong? [W]hy
do ye not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" I Corinthians 6:1-7 (King James).
170. HORWTZ, supra note 1, at 151, n. 68 (citing 2 T. CLARKSON, A PORTRAITURE OF
QUAKERISM 57 (Phila. 1808)).
171. Id. at 151 (citing 2 T. CLARKSON, A PORTRAITURE OF QUAKERISM 56 (Phila. 1808)).
172. Id. at 151 (citing I A. CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION INAMERICA
210-211 (1965); ODIORNE, "Arbitration and Mediation among the Early Quakers," 9 ARB.
Jo. 161 (1954)).
173. Id. at 151 (citing I Dali. iv. (Preface to reports)).
174. Id. at 152.
175. Id. at 153-54.
176. Id. at 152-53.
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New Jersey's Quaker History
Like Pennsylvania, New Jersey was heavily influenced by the
Quakers. New Jersey began as a single proprietary colony in 1664 but was
split into two proprietary colonies, East Jersey and West Jersey, in
1682.177 After a time, both colonies were sold to Quakers, but they developed along different lines. 178 West Jersey's laws and courts reflected79its
Quaker heritage and proximity to Quaker-dominated Pennsylvania.1 It
was the first Quaker colony to be established in America and "[p]erhaps
its most significant and lasting characteristic was the pervasive influence
of the liberal and humane Quaker philosophy."180 East Jersey also had a
considerable number of Quakers who were predominant in land holding
and government, but its population was more diverse than West Jersey,
and its laws were more reflective of Puritan New England.1l
Throughout the proprietary period, the "overwhelming majority of
82
West New Jersey settlers were Quakers."1 The proprietors "for the most
part were indifferent to the welfare of the inhabitants" and, as a result,
"[b]asic concepts of conduct were continually renewed, fortified, and
redefined" by the Quaker leaders. 8 3 In both colonies, Quakers84 served in
governmental capacities as governors and assembly members. 1
The East and West Jersey colonies remained separate until 1702,
when they were combined to form the royal colony of New Jersey.185
After becoming a united royal province, New Jersey was ruled by a
provincial governor and his councilmen who were appointed equally from
86
what had been East Jersey and West Jersey.1 New Jersey also had a legislature or assembly comprised of representatives from each of New
Jersey's seven counties. 187 The legislature "had no part in constituting or
...
188 The judiciary consisted of local justices of
regulating the courts.
the peace and county courts, which had a limited jurisdiction; the supreme
court, which exercised appellate and original jurisdiction; and, finally, the
177. 1 A. CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 194 (University of

Oklahoma Press 1965).
178. PETER CHARLES HOFFER, LAW AND PEOPLE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 32 (The

Johns

Hopkins University Press 1992).
179. Id.
180. RICHARD P. MCCORMICK, NEW JERSEY FROM COLONY TO STATE: 1609-1789 38 (D.

Van Nostrand Company, Inc. 1964).
181. HOFFER, supra note 178, at 32.
182. JOHN E. POMFRET, THE PROVINCE OF WEST NEW JERSEY, 1609-1702: A HISTORY OF
THE ORIGINS OF AN AMERICAN COLONY 216 (Princeton University Press 1956).

183. POMFRET, supra note 182, at 216.
184. RUFUS M. JONES, THE QUAKERS IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 379 (Macmillan and

Co., Limited 1911).
185. MCCORMICK, supra note 180, at 58.

186. Id. at 59-61.
187. Id.
188. Id. at62.
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governor and his council, which served as the province's highest court by
hearing appeals from the supreme court. 189
It was during this time, at the turn of the century, that the population
in New Jersey began to change. 190 Immigration was increasingly nonQuaker and, by the early 1700s, "no more than half of the inhabitants of
the province were Quakers."191 This diversity was reflected throughout the
provincial period as New Jersey was settled by high populations of Dutch,
German, Swedish, and French settlers. 192 The colony remained largely
agricultural with some iron mining, lumbering, fishing, skilled craftsmanship, and small scale commercial activities. Commercial activity was widely dispersed and "merchants as a class were not so powerful or influential
as in the neighboring colonies [of Pennsylvania and New York]."19 4
New Jersey was also diverse religiously, with Presbyterians and
Quakers holding the largest number of congregations and the Dutch
Reformed, Baptists, and Anglicans holding lesser numbers of congregations. 195 There were also smaller numbers of German Lutherans, Swedish
Lutherans, and Methodists.196 Many of the congregations were hampered
by an inability to secure pastors. The Presbyterians seemed to lead in
strength with well-educated pastors and their own college, the College of
New Jersey (later Princeton).197 Nevertheless, the Quakers asserted a distinctive influence in West Jersey throughout the 1700s.198 Although they
began to withdraw politically because of their pacifism, "[m]ore than any
other denomination, they were to serve as the moral conscience for the
new society."1 99 Throughout the 1700s, Quaker mores exerted influence
in "the cultural pattern of the Delaware valley." 200 The Quakers predominated in humanitarian concerns, and "as the years passed they won many
allies among the members of other denominations." 201
During the provincial era, "the assembly remained a powerful organ
of the popular will." 202 Although often divided into various factions,
including Scotch proprietors, English proprietors, various business
189. Id.
190. Id. at 52.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 80-81.
193. Id. at 87-92.
194. Id. at 91.
195. Out of 180 total congregations, the congregations held by each of these sects were:
Presbyterian, 50; Quaker, 40; Dutch Reformed, 30; Baptist, 30; and Anglican, 20. Id. at 93.
196. Out of 180 total congregations, the German Lutherans, Swedish Lutherans, and
Methodists combined held 10 congregations. Id. at 93.
197. Id. at 93.
198. Id. at 95.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 52.
201. Id. at 102.
202. Id. at 63.
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investors, Quakers, and Anglicans, "the assembly was a potent instrument
done in the colony
of representative government. . .[and] little could be 203
that did not have a fair measure of public acceptance."
This same strength of the assembly was reflected in early statehood.
When New Jersey declared itself an independent state, it set up a new
state government in 1776 that reflected the legislative and judicial branches of the provincial government but was greatly weighted in authority
toward the legislature. 204 Throughout the 1780s, the Quakers dominated
former West Jersey politics while former East Jersey was dominated by a
faction of agrarian-debtors. 205 East Jersey and West Jersey members of
in conflict over key issues such as boundthe legislature were frequently
20 6
ary lines and finances.
After the Revolution, Quakers continued to be a powerful force and
207
the competing political parties vied for their support in the early 1800s.

The law did not change to any great extent after the Revolution since the
New Jersey Constitution continued those laws that had been on the statute
books as of 1776.208 This included the English common law as practiced
in New Jersey prior to 1776.209

As the history of New Jersey shows, the Quaker influence was widespread during its founding and continued to affect the cultural development of the new state after the Revolutionary War. As the Quakers settled
the area that came to be the state of New Jersey, they brought with them
their own unique customs and traditions. Among these was a strict adherence to the use of arbitration as the preferred means of dispute resolution.
One of the best ways to highlight the importance Quakers placed on arbitration as a means of dispute resolution is by exploring the records of their
monthly and yearly meetings.
Extrajudicial Dispute Resolution Among Quakers in New Jersey
As they made the New World their home, the Quakers established wor2 10
ship and monthly organizational meetings in both East and West Jersey.
They also established quarterly and yearly meetings, with the yearly meeting
Pennsylvania
alternating between Burlington, West Jersey and Philadelphia,
2
until 1764, and remaining in Philadelphia thereafter. 11
203. Id. at 63, 78.
204. Id. at 158.
205. CARL E. PRINCE, NEW JERSEY'S JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICANS: THE GENESIS OF AN

EARLY PARTY MACHINE: 1789-1817 7 (University of North Carolina Press 1964).
206. MCCORMICK, supra note 180, at 159.

207. WALTER R. FEE, THE TRANSITION FROM ARISTOCRACY TO DEMOCRACY IN NEW
JERSEY: 1789-1829 134-35, 150 (Somerset Press, Inc. 1933).
208. 4 NEW JERSEY: A HISTORY 1148 (IRVING S. KULL, ed.) (The American Historical
Society, Inc. 1930).

209. Id.
210. POMFRET, supra note 182, at 217.
2
211. Id. at 219- 5.
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Before the establishment of the yearly meeting, the Burlington
Monthly Meeting "exerted remarkable leadership among the Quaker communities." 2 12 In 1679, Quakers at the Thirdhaven Monthly Meeting were
instructed that "no Friend go forward in any suit of law without the advice
and consent" of the Monthly Meeting. 2 13 At the 1681 Burlington Yearly
Meeting, the Quakers were instructed not to resolve their disputes in
courts of law but, instead, first to bring their disputes to the Monthly
Meeting to be resolved: "It is ordered that if any differences do arise
betwixt any two persons that profess Truth, that they do not go to law
before they first lay it before the particular Monthly Meeting that they do
2 14
belong unto."
Under this system, a dispute was to be submitted first to the reference
of at least two Friends and, if that proved to be unsatisfactory, it was to be
resolved at the Monthly Meeting. 2 15 Compliance was taken seriously, and
the Burlington Monthly Meeting warned strongly about the judgment one
would incur for repudiating the arbitrators' award. 2 16 Both the disputes and
the means by which they were settled were to be reported at the Monthly
Meeting. 2 17 This policy was reiterated at the 1710 Yearly Meeting:
'As to Friends going to law with one another, it is the sense of this meeting that
such things may not be admitted among us, but that as one party is ever in the
wrong, that they may be found out and proper advice given and justice demanded; which, if neglected or refused, let such be testified against, as unworthy of
our communion, and that without too much delay; that where the law of God, of
righteousness, and Truth doth not take place in the heart, the law of men may
2
curb and punish the wrong and injustice.' 18

The Quakers were clear in stating that to go to law was to be excommunicated from the Quaker society. The penalty for going to law was
harsh, but the meeting record did go on, however, to list some narrow circumstances in which the Quakers believed the ability to receive a judgment of law was necessary and, therefore, permissible:
'Yet nevertheless, in cases of executors, attorneys, factors, or the like, where both
parties are agreed, but cannot effect the right and just part without a judgment of
law in some temporal court, which, if necessary, must be had for the legal security of one or both, this meeting thought fit to declare, that any Monthly Meeting
may judge of such necessity, and as they see cause, suffer the parties to have legal
proceedings, so as not to reproach the Truth by contention or otherwise; being at
the request of them both, and no other way to obtain their right and safety.' 2 19
212. Id. at 224.
213. EzRA MICHENER, A RETROSPECT OF EARLY QUAKERISM; BEING ExTRACrs FROM THE
RECORDS OF PHILADELPHIA YEARLY MEETING AND THE MEETINGS COMPOSING IT 266 (T.

Ellwood Zell 1860). This text is a reproduction of the records of the Philadelphia Yearly
Meeting as well as the Burlington Monthly Meeting (among others).
214. Id. at 266-67.
215. POMFRET, supra note 182, at 225.
216. Id. at 225.

217. Id. at 225.
218. MICHENER, supra note 213, at 267-68.

219. Id. at 267-68.
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At the following Yearly Meeting, the Quakers addressed some
details of the alternative to using courts of law and held that, in cases
where arbitrators were in disagreement and the Monthly Meeting had
judged the cases, the party who felt wronged by the Monthly Meeting's
decision would have the right to appeal to a superior meeting (such as the
Quarterly or Yearly Meeting). 220 Thus, while, as stated previously,
Quakers placed great emphasis on their members abiding by the decisions
of arbitrators, they also provided for those instances in which justice
would demand the need for an appeal.
Several years later, at the 1719 Yearly Meeting, the meeting records
again asserted both the general notion that Quakers were not to go to
courts of law and also the special circumstances in which the judgment of
a court of law might be deemed necessary for recovery:
In cases of debtors absconding, bankrupts, &c., the Monthly Meetings may 'permit, or hold excused, such as shall appear to them really necessitated to proceed
otherwise.' And executors, administrators, &c., 'may be permitted to have the
matter tried at law, or rather first determined in our friendly way, and then by
consent, confirmed by a judgment, as the meeting may see occasion upon the
matter to advise and direct; with this caution and care, that the parties on both
therein, do still appear and behave towards each other in brothersides concerned
22 1
ly love.'

The language here is important not only for the general rule and
exceptions it provides, but also for the emphasis it places on Quakers settling all disputes outside of court, ('first determined in our friendly way"),
even those that may later need a judgment of law in order to be effective. It
was at this meeting that the Quakers also asserted that Quakers should not
go to courts of law with non-Quakers without first attempting to resolve the
dispute through arbitration. 222 This policy acknowledged that non-Quakers
could not be required to submit their disputes with Quakers to arbitration
but nevertheless encouraged Quakers to offer arbitration as an option for
settling their disputes with non-Quakers whenever prudently possible.
The record of this meeting also reiterated the procedures regulating
dispute resolution between Quakers, stating that a Quaker in conflict with
another Quaker should first go to the other person and try to work it out.

If that proved unsuccessful, he should take one or two Friends, "'either
the overseers or other discreet, judicious Friends"223 with him to try to
work out a judicious end to the matter.224 If the dispute remained unsettled and the accompanying Friends could not persuade the disputing
220. Id. at 276-78.
221. Id.at 268.
222. Id. at 269.
223. Id. at 270.
224. Quaker teaching here stems from what must have been the familiar teachings of Jesus
as recorded in The Gospel of Matthew. "Moreover, if thy brother shall trespass against thee, go
and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy
brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of
two or three witnesses every word may be established." The Gospel of Matthew 18:15-16
(King James).
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Friends to end their dispute, then the accompanying Friends were "to
admonish and persuade the parties to choose referees or arbitrators." 225
Adherence to the award was emphasized with the statement that the disputing Friends should "engage themselves to stand to and abide by the
determination of such referees or arbitrators, as usual in such cases." 226
In cases in which one party refused to arbitrate, the Quakers provided that the complying party should report the noncompliance to the
Monthly Meeting where the parties could then "nominate, and each
choose, one or more Friends, as the importance of the matter may require;
and the meeting add one or more Friends to them, as they see occasion,
for the determining of the said difference by majority." 227 If the party
refusing to arbitrate did not attend the meeting, the meeting would nevertheless move forward in appointing arbitrators and a time and place for
the arbitration. 228 In recognition that noncompliance might continue, the
record stated that
.. if either party refuses to attend the arbitrators, and submit their case, or [to]
stand to and abide the award, judgment, or determination of the Friends so nominated, chosen, or appointed, such person must be dealt with as one disorderly,
and that regards not peace either in himself or in the Church, and that slights the
love, order, and unity of the brethren. And, after due admonition, if he or she per229
sists therein, let such be disowned and testified against by the meeting ....

Once a party had been disowned, the offended Friend could "seek
his remedy against him or her (so disowned) at the law." 230 This meeting
also affirmed both the need for strict adherence to the arbitration award
and the ability of disputing Friends to appeal from awards that they
believed to be unjust.2 31 The fact that the Quakers fully intended their
members to live by these regulations is evidenced by the disowning of a
member at the 1734 Concord Monthly Meeting for refusal to arbitrate and
refusal to accept the judgment of the arbitrators appointed. 232 An offending Friend would remain ostracized from the Society "until he, from a
sense of his error, do make such an acknowledgment as may be to the satisfaction of this meeting." 233 Two years later, the 1736 Concord Monthly
Meeting record showed the appointment of arbitrators for a party who was
not willing to arbitrate 234 and in 1756, twenty years later, the Thirdhaven
225. MICHENER, supranote 182, at 270.
226. Id. at 269-70.
227. Id. at 267-68.
228. Id. at 271.
229. Id. at 270. Quaker doctrine here is a direct continuation of the teachings in Matthew.
After requiring discussion one-on-one or, if necessary, with one or two other Christian
brothers, Jesus then states, "And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church: but
if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican. The
Gospel of Matthew 18:17 (King James).
230. MICHENER, supra note 182, at 270.

231.
232.
233.
234.

Id.
Id. at 272.
Id.
Id.
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Monthly Meeting record showed a Quaker applying for and receiving permission to go to a court of law "for the recovery of some small debts, that
he has due to him from sundry persons who are not Friends ...

"235

Thus, throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, Quakers not
only asserted a policy of submitting their disputes to arbitration whenever
possible, but also supported that policy through the actions and declarations of their monthly and yearly meetings.
The Burlington Court Book shows that, shortly after the promulgation of the Quaker order to refrain from lawsuits, Quakers rarely appeared
in the court minutes and, even then, it was often when only one party was
a Quaker. 236 Quakers did, however, serve in large numbers as judges in
the courts and also as representatives in the West New Jersey assembly. 237 Although they were opposed to using the court system themselves,

they served in these capacities in an effort keep down the number of lawsuits as well as their costs. 238 They used arbitration among themselves
239
In
and "kept their own members out of the courts to a great extent."
arbitration
addition, the Burlington minutes reveal cases that employed
240
"to end suits already begun before the secular tribunal."
It was this Quaker ideology that prevailed in the court system
throughout the proprietary period and the call was for a "spirit of open,
easy, and inexpensive justice ... "141 As stated by Jerold Auerbach in his
work, Justice Without Law, the essence and outworking of this Quaker
ideology was that:
No attorneys' fees were required, anyone could plead his own cause. If conflict
could not always be suppressed prior to litigation, the pressure for harmonious
resolution was evident even after litigation began. At various stages the parties
might request arbitration; at times the court ordered it. Arbitrators constantly
struggled to reassert the principle of harmony. (One award instructed the
disputants that 'all quarrels, etc. between the said parties to this day cease.'
Another set of arbitrators pleaded 'for the ending of all differences from the
beginning of the world to the date hereof.')242

235. Id.
236. THE

BURLINGTON COURT BOOK: A RECORD OF QUAKER JURISPRUDENCE IN WEST NEW

JERSEY: 1680-1709 xii (H. CLAY REED & GEORGE J. MILLER EDS., 1994) (reprint Kraus

Reprint Co. 1975) (American Historical Association 1944) (hereinafter, BURLINGTON COURT
BOOK). The Burlington Court Book is a reproduction of the minutes of the Burlington Court
from 1680-1709.
237. Id. at xlvi, xlviii, li.
238. Id. at xlvii.
239. Id. at xlvii.
240. Id. at xlvii.
241. POMFRET, supra note 182, at 185. See also BURLINGTON COURT BOOK, supra note

236.
242. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 30 (Oxford University Press 1983)
(citing TOLLES, MEETING HOUSE AND COUNTING HOUSE, 64-65,75-76; ODIORNE, 'Arbitration
and Mediation,' 164-65; REED AND MILLER, BURLINGTON COURT BOOK, xii, xlvii, 2, 29, 39,

44, 46, 70, 299, 339).
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Horwitz's Pennsylvania Statutory and Case Law Conclusions as They
Apply to New Jersey: Overview of Pennsylvania Statutes
Pennsylvania adopted an extrajudicial dispute resolution statute early
on, in 1705.243 The Act allowed disputing parties to refer their dispute to
arbitration and have the award entered in court. It stated:
In all cases where the plaintiff and defendant have accounts to produce one
against another they may either by themselves or attorneys consent to a rule of
court for referring the adjustment thereof to certain persons, mutually chosen by
them in open court, the award, or report of such referees, being made according
to the submission of the parties, and approved of by the court, and entered upon
the record, shall have the same effect, and shall be deemed to be as available in
law, as a verdict given by the jury. The awarded to be paid, shall have judgment,
2
or a scire facias for the recovery thereof, as the case may require. 44

An 1806 Act provided for two additional means by which parties
could resolve their disputes extra-judicially: (1) by agreeing to submit to
arbitrators of their choosing before going to court, or (2) by agreeing, in a
pending court action, to consent to the court's rule of reference, which
would refer their cause to arbitrators of their choosing. 245 The 1806
statute also provided for the procedural requirements of arbitration
through oaths and procedures governing the final award. 246 In 1836,
Pennsylvania passed a new law of arbitration that allowed for both compulsory and voluntary arbitration. This law replaced the 1806 statute and,
according to Horwitz, with the passage of the 1836 statute, arbitration
came to be highly regulated in Pennsylvania. 247
Horwitz argues that Pennsylvania passed these arbitration statutes
with the intent to regulate arbitration. He suggests that, in Quaker
Pennsylvania, extrajudicial dispute resolution was effectively limited to a
function of the court and an item of statutory law not so it could be promoted, but so it could be regulated and, by the mid-1830s, strictly inter248
preted nearly out of existence.
The Unanswered Question
In his Pennsylvania account, Horwitz explains early Quaker promotion of arbitration, but then focuses on the political motivations of an
emerging legal elite in order to explain the elimination of extrajudicial
forns of dispute resolution. But there is a question left unanswered here:
what happened to the Quakers? The underlying assumption seems to be
that the Quakers lost their influence (at best) or were absorbed into the
243.

FRANCIS KELLOR, ARBITRATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION: A REPORT PREPARED

FOR THE SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

13 (American Arbitration Association 1952).

Id. at 32 (quoting the Act).
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 14.
HoRwrrz, supra note 1, at 152-154.
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legal system (at worst) in the 1780-1860 time period. But this seems
unlikely. Pennsylvania was "at the forefront of the colonies in providing
for arbitration." 249 Furthermore, it was populated by Quakers who supported extrajudicial dispute resolution not for political reasons, but for
ideological reasons-reasons which were core to their understanding of
what it meant to be Quakers. Would their ideals be cast off so easily by
the rising legal elite, as Horwitz seems to suggest?
Not in New Jersey. Although Horwitz claims that the emerging
Pennsylvania legal elite was politically motivated to bring about a revolution in the use of arbitration through the passage and strict construction of
Pennsylvania's arbitration statutes, the history of New Jersey suggests a
very different purpose in the creation, application, and support of New
Jersey's arbitration statutes. In its comprehensive extrajudicial dispute resolution statute of 1794, the New Jersey legislature provided for several different kinds of extrajudicial dispute resolution, each of which the New
Jersey judiciary supported, according to its statutory provisions, throughout the antebellum period. Furthermore-and this is where the ideological
factor comes into play-the statutory regulations and the actual use of
extrajudicial dispute resolution in New Jersey mirrored not only the common law of England but, more significantly, the rules and regulations that
had been laid down by New Jersey Quakers for the use of extrajudicial dispute resolution among their members as early as the mid- to late-1600s.
Thus, far from evidencing a politically motivated legal elite which sought
to eliminate extrajudicial dispute resolution, the New Jersey statutes and
their interpretation by the judiciary reflect a long-standing Quaker religious
ideology that favored extrajudicial methods of resolving disputes.
Quaker Influence on Extrajudicial Dispute Resolution Statutes in
West New Jersey, East New Jersey, and the Unified New Jersey State
This specifically Quaker influence on New Jersey's extrajudicial dispute resolution statutes is demonstrated throughout New Jersey history.
On September 20, 1682, the assembly of the colony of West Jersey passed
the first arbitration law of any of the colonies. 250 The law stated that lawsuits below a certain amount should be submitted to arbitration. 25 1 By
1688, East Jersey had followed suit and included arbitration in its laws as
well. 252 Arbitration remained "an important method of settling disputes
among the colonists" of New Jersey and, after the Revolution, New Jersey
continued to support arbitration by adopting the English common law
with its understanding of arbitration. 253
1,at 151.
250. KELLOR, supra note 243, at 11-12 (citing COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NEW JERSEY,
by S. Whitney Landon, Jr. (1925)).
251. Id. at 12.
252. Id.
253. Id,. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, England supported four
forms of arbitration through either the common law or Acts of Parliament: (1) arbitration by
249. HORwrrz, supra note
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The first New Jersey state statute referring to arbitration was passed
on June 2, 1790.254 The statute was a supplement to a previous act regarding the making of a bank, dam, and waterworks along Newton Creek. The
supplement included a provision by which individuals aggrieved under
the Act could bring their grievances to reference. Under this section, an
aggrieved individual could submit the grievance to reference by providing, within ten days notice to the person by whom he was aggrieved, a
statement that he intended to apply to the Court of Common Pleas for an
appointment of referees to settle the dispute. If the attending parties
agreed, then, under a rule of reference, the judges of the Court of
Common Pleas would appoint "three or more judicious Freeholders of the
county" to "hear the parties and make their report at the next or any subsequent term." 2 5 5 The court gave the referees broad authority, stating that
the referees were "fully authorized and empowered to hear and finally
determine upon every circumstance, matter, and thing whatsoever that
shall be laid before them by the parties" as related to the creek or dam,
and that the referees could award whatever relief they believed "to be just
mutual consent outside of court (the most basic form of common law arbitration, which I
have termed "Independent Arbitration"), (2) arbitration by mutual consent outside of court
with award enforcement (whereby parties could seek to have their arbitration award entered
as a rule of the court and thereby protected by the contempt power of the court, which I have
termed "Arbitration with Award Enforcement"), (3) reference by consent under order of the
court (whereby parties in a pending action could agree to refer their dispute to arbitration.
instead, and have the award entered as a judgment of the court, which I have termed
"Reference by Order of the Court"), and (4) reference under statutory command (whereby
disputes regarding specific subject matters were required to be submitted to arbitration). See
BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at * 16-17 and I EARL OF HALSBURY LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF
GREAT BRITAIN, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND BEING A COMPLETE STATEMENT OF THE WHOLE LAW

OF ENGLAND 437-493 (London, Butterworth & Co. 1907) [hereinafter LAWS OF ENGLAND].

England passed a comprehensive Arbitration Act in 1889 that superseded the previous laws
while continuing the previous methods of arbitration. See I THE COMPLETE STATUES OF
ENGLAND, CLASSIFIED AND ANNOTATED IN CONTINUATION OF HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND
AND FOR READY REFERENCE ENTITLED "HALSBURY'S STATUES OF ENGLAND" 451-71 (London:

Butterworth & Co. 1929) [hereinafter STATUTES OF ENGLAND]. As will be demonstrated, the
New Jersey Quakers required forms of arbitration that mirrored the first two of these four
forms (Independent Arbitration and Arbitration with Award Enforcement). The New Jersey
Legislature and Judicial system subsequently adopted both of those forms, as well as the
additional form of Reference by Order of the Court. This latter form extended the power and
use of arbitration by making it applicable to cases where actions were already pending. This
latter form is a reflection of the Quaker admonishment for members, whenever prudently
possible, to seek to remove any pending action from court and refer it to arbitration instead.
Since the purpose of this article is to explore the relationship between the emerging legal
profession (as embodied in the New Jersey judiciary and legislature) and the Quaker promotion of extrajudicial dispute resolution, I will primarily draw connections between the
actions and attitudes of the New Jersey legal profession and the Quakers, although the principles of the common law may also be reflected.
254. A Supplement to an Act, entitled, 'An Act to enable the Owners and Possessors of
Meadow and Marsh lying on Newton Creek, in the County of Gloucester, to make and maintain
a Bank, Dam and necessary Water-works, to stop the Tide out of the said Creek and to
keep the Water-course thereof open and clear.' ACTS OF THE FOURTEENTH GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, June 2, 1790, §§ 1-6.

255. id. at § 5.
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256
and equitable."
As stated in the statute, this provision was included "in order that all
matters of difference now existing, or that may hereafter exist" between7
the parties under the statute, "may be speedily and equitably adjusted."25
The purpose of the statute is reminiscent of the desire of the Kentucky
courts and legislatures to end land disputes with speed and equity. The
language of the statute, however, hearkens back to Quaker notions that
parties in dispute could agree before or after entering a court of law to
submit their differences to a panel of referees, instead. This statute recognized the validity of that option and upheld it, stating that the resulting
award would be made "a judgment of the Court" and "shall be conclusive
to the parties." 258 Thus, in 1790, the New Jersey state legislature affirmed
the validity and importance of both the use of reference by parties in dispute and the court's role in encouraging and enforcing this means of
extrajudicial dispute resolution.
On December 2, 1794, New Jersey further evidenced its support for
extrajudicial dispute resolution when it passed a comprehensive extrajudicial dispute resolution statute entitled, "An Act for regulating References
and determining Controversies by Arbitration." 259 The stated purpose of
the Act was "to promote trade, to facilitate the means of accommodation,
to expedite the determination of controversies, and to render the awards of
...
260 The statute stated that the motivaarbitrators the more effectual.
tion behind the Act was that

it hath been found by experience, that references, made by rule of court, have
contributed much to the advancement of justice, and the ease of the people, especially where long and intricate accounts, which are most proper for deliberate
261
examination, are the subject of discussion ....

The statute assumed the existence of Independent Arbitration where
parties voluntarily bound themselves to arbitration under the common
law. The statute then addressed both Arbitration with Award Enforcement
and Reference by Order of the Court.
Under section 1, the statute was addressed to "all persons, who are
desirousof ending, by arbitration,any controversy, suit, quarrel, or matter
in contention, for which there is no other remedy but by personal action,
or suit in equity" may agree to undergo arbitration by a "a rule of the
court." 262 The italicized portion acknowledges of the existence of
Independent Arbitration. The ability of the parties to use Independent
Arbitration to settle their disputes was reflective of the very first kind of
236. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. ACTS OF THE NINETEENTH
December 2, 1794, §§ 1-6.
260. Id. at Preface.
261. Id.
262. Id. at § I (emphasis added).

GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
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arbitration promoted by the Quakers. The only pressure on the parties
here would be non-legal.
The statute then went on to provide for what I have termed
Arbitration with Award Enforcement. In this portion, the statute expressed
the legislature's desire to "render the awards of arbitrators the more effectual" by providing that parties could strengthen the legal force of an
Independent Arbitration award by making the submission and award a rule
of the court. 263 To do so, the parties would need to assert that agreement in
the submission of their dispute to the arbitrators and, therefore, to "oblige
themselves respectively to submit to the award ..
"264 At this point, the
arbitration would proceed much like an Independent Arbitration. The parties would choose their arbitrators and once the award had been decided
upon by the arbitrators, witnesses to the agreement to make the award a
rule of the court would submit an affidavit to the court. The affidavit
would be filed and entered into the court records, and the award would be
made a rule of the court. 265 If one of the parties then failed to abide by the
award, he would be "subject to all the penalties of contemning a rule of
court, when he is a suitor or defendant in such court, and the court, on
motion, shall issue process accordingly ..
"266 Once the award was
agreed to be made a rule of the court, it would be upheld, "unless it shall
be made appear on oath or affirmation to such court, that the arbitrators or
umpire misbehaved themselves, and that such award, arbitration or umpirage, was procured by corruption, or other undue means." 267
This, too, reflected Quaker notions of arbitration in that the Quakers
recognized and provided permission for those occasions in which an arbitration award would need to be entered as a rule of the court in order to
provide the necessary protections for the disputing parties. 268 Notice,
however, the optional status of this provision. In order for court enforcement to occur, the statute required a witnessed affidavit stating that the
parties had mutually agreed to enter the award as a rule of the court and to
make it legally binding. The affidavit requirement seems to be an affirmation of Independent Arbitration in that the court is prohibited from involving itself in an arbitration between the parties unless it is clear that both
parties agreed to the court involvement.
Section 2 provided further protections for individuals using arbitration by stating that arbitrations procured by fraud would be set aside by
the court. 269 The statute provided for the long-term security of arbitration
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See supra notes 219 and 221 and accompanying text.
269. An Act for regulating References and determining Controversies by Arbitration,
ACTS OF THE NINETEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, supra note
259, at § 1-2.
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awards by providing a statute of limitations for making claims of "corruption, or undue means." 270 In section 6, the statute sought further to insure
the fairness and justice of the awards by providing that, in arbitration
cases, "every arbitrator shall . . . take an oath or affirmation," which
required him to agree "faithfully to hear and examine the cause in question, and make a just and true report, according to the best of his skill and
understanding." 27 1 The statute then went on to offer disputants a third
means of extrajudicial dispute resolution: reference by Order of the Court.
The mechanism of Reference by Order of the Court is also reflective
of Quaker ideals. Although Quakers did not wish to see their members go
to courts of law, and directed them to resolve their disputes through
Independent Arbitration and Arbitration with Award Enforcement whenever possible, they nevertheless recognized that there might be some
occasions when parties would find themselves in court. On those occasions, the Quakers directed their members to seek once more to remove
the dispute out of court and into extrajudicial dispute resolution if it
would be prudent to do so. 272 The guidelines provided by the Quakers in
their Monthly Meetings for removing a case from a court of law to reference are a precursor of this statute's discussion and affirmation of
Reference by Order of the Court.
The 1794 statute provided for the details of Reference by Order of
the Court, stating that "whenever a cause shall be referred, by rule of
court, to referees, the report or award of such referees, or of the major
part of them, if confirmed by the court, shall be final, and conclude the
parties ..
"273 The statute provided for court-ordered enforcement and
execution of the payments under the report, as well as the granting of
costs to the prevailing party as would be granted under law. 274 This language further strengthened the power of referees' reports, perhaps encouraging parties to consider the benefits of submitting their in-court dispute
to reference instead. Furthermore, the oath requirement of section 4
seemed to encourage Reference by Order of the Court between parties
who had already brought their dispute into the judicial system by giving
them the security of knowing that their court-appointed referees were
275
bound by the same standards of truth and justice as in the law court.
The last part of the statute that dealt with reference was section 5.
270. Id.
271. Id. at § 6, 4.
272. At the 1719 Yearly Meeting, Quakers stated that a friend in dispute should not go
through litigation in a court of law without "having offered (where he safely may), . . to put
the matter to a neighborly reference" and that Friends in conflict with others should "show a
willingness and readiness to agree it peaceably between themselves, or to submit to a reference." MICHENER, supra note 213, at 269.
273. An Act for regulating References and determining Controversies by Arbitration,

ACTS OF THE NINETEENTH
259, at § 3.
274. Id.
275. Id. at § 6, 4.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, supra note
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Under section 5, the statute provided the referee with a compensation of one
dollar for each day spent on the reference as well as a "reasonable
allowance for his expenses," with these costs to be paid by the prevailing
party, and then "allowed to such party in the taxation of costs, where costs
are recoverable." 276 Furthermore, the statute granted to referees operating
under Reference by Order of the Court the ability to issue subpoenas to call
witnesses and to examine witnesses under oaths that the referees' themselves would administer. Again, although not explicitly stated, the practical
goal of such provisions seemed to be to encourage individuals to use
Reference by Order of the Court by providing the referees with many of the
same financial benefits and evidentiary powers held by the judicial system.
In each of the three types of extrajudicial dispute resolution included
in this statute, the legislature built on notions of extrajudicial dispute
resolution that had been asserted and practiced by the Quaker population
for years. Thus, far from seeking to over-regulate or limit the use of
arbitration, the legislature seemed to be trying to enhance the use
and effectiveness of both arbitration and reference among those members
of the increasingly diverse New Jersey society who might be less willing
to mutually bind themselves to an arbitrator or referee to resolve their
disputes.
The 1794 statute experienced only minor modifications in the following years. In 1818, the legislature passed an act that, among other
things, extended to the justices of the peace and the court of common
pleas the ability to conduct Reference by Order of the Court as provided
for under the 1794 statute. 277 In 1820, the legislature passed a supplement
to the 1818 statute that allowed appeals from referee reports that had been
entered as a judgment of the court by a justice of the peace along the same
2 78
lines by which other appeals were granted.
An 1821 statute also supplemented the 1818 act. 279 Among other
280
things, the 1821 Act restated the right to appeal from referees' reports.
To protect reports against frivolous appeals, section 6 stated that appeals
would not be granted unless the appealing party filed an affidavit stating
that "the said appeal is not intended for the purpose of delay, and that he
verily believes that he hath a just and legal defence [sic] to make upon the
merits of the case. . . ."281 What would such a "just and legal defence"
look like? In the absence of intervening statutory law, it seems that to be
276. Id. at § 5.

277. An act constituting courts for the trial of small causes, ACT

OF THE FORTY-FIRST

GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, February 12, 1818, §§ 1, 36, 40-41.
278. Supplement to the act, entitled "An act constituting courts for the trial of small causes," passed the twelfth day of February, one thousand eight hundred and eighteen. ACT OF THE
FORTY-FIFTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, November 17, 1820, § 1-7.
279. A further Supplement to the act, entitled, "An act constituting courts for the trial of
small causes," passed February twelfth, one thousand eight hundred and eighteen, ACT OF
THE FoRTY-SIxTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF JERSEY, November 23, 1821, §§ 1-7.
280. Id. at § 2.
281. Id. at § 6.
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just and legal, an appropriate challenge would assert behavior that was not
in keeping with the requirements of a referee as stated under the 1794
statute, namely, that the referee would promise "faithfully and fairly to
hear and examine the cause in question, and make a just and true report,
according to the best of his skill and understanding .. "282
Judicial Response to New Jersey's Extrajudicial Dispute Resolution
Statutes
As shown through the 1794, 1818, 1820, and 1821 statutes, the New
Jersey legislature looked favorably on extrajudicial dispute resolution
throughout the early antebellum period. The legislature consciously or
unconsciously reflected Quaker ideology in its codification of extrajudicial dispute resolution, modifying it only to extend its use to small claims
and provide for necessary appeals in disputes of all sizes. The next question is how the New Jersey court system responded to the use of extrajudicial dispute resolution among the citizens who passed through its system.
The research suggests, in the time period studied, the New Jersey
Supreme Court remained favorable to extrajudicial dispute resolution and
ruled on it in ways that, like the statutory provisions, reflected long-standing Quaker principles of resolving disputes outside of court. This attitude
is attested to by four trends evident in the court's decisions in the antebellum period: (1) affirmation all three kinds of extrajudicial dispute resolution throughout the antebellum period; (2) reflection of the common law
desire to protect against fraud; (3) provision for necessary appeals while
supporting the finality of awards; and (4) guarding against reversing on
mere technicalities.
Court Support for All Three Kinds of Extrajudicial Dispute Resolution
Throughout the antebellum period, the New Jersey Supreme Court
continued to uphold the legality and viability of all three kinds of extrajudicial dispute resolution that had been recognized first by the Quakers,
and then by the 1794 statute.
In the 1791 case of Schooley v. Thorne,283 Reference by Order of the
Court was upheld as permissible where the parties agreed to refer their
dispute. The judge also recognized the traditional, common law availability of Independent Arbitration:
282. An Act for regulating References and determining Controversies by Arbitration,
ACTS OF THE NINETEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, supra note

259, § 4. The full language states: "And be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, That, in
every cause referred by rule of court, each referee shall, before he proceeds to the business
of the reference, take an oath, or affirmation, faithfully and fairly to hear and examine the
cause in question, and make a just and true report, according to the best of his skill and
understanding; which oath and affirmation any judge of any court of record, or any justice of
the peace of this state, is hereby authorized and required to administer."
283. 1 N.J.L. 83 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1791).
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Every party clearly has a right to agree to submit his cause to other judges than
those the law has appointed for him. The utility of these amicable references has
law right,
been perceived and encouraged by the legislature, but it is a common
284
which grew into notice under the encouragement of the courts.

The court further expressed support for Independent Arbitration in
the 1828 case of Sherron v. Wood.285 In Sherron, the parties had agreed to
submit their dispute to arbitration but had not agreed to make the award a
judgment of the court. The award was found against Wood, and Sherron
brought an action of debt on the arbitration bond. Wood brought pleas
against the award. In refusing to invalidate the award, the court emphasized repeatedly that:
[t]he arbitrators are judges chosen by the parties themselves, and their awards are
not examinable in a court, and then only for corruption or gross partiality. Courts
contradicting the award or impeaching the
of law cannot listen to suggestions
286
conduct of the arbitrators.

Moreover, the court interpreted the 1794 statute to mean that "our statute
respecting arbitration" . . . says that courts... "never do, nor can, in a
summary way, interfere with or set aside an award when the parties have
not agreed that their submission to arbitration, should be made a rule of
court." 287 Finally, the court emphasized its unwillingness to enter into disputes between parties uninvited:
If the parties wish to give this court jurisdiction over their awards, the law has
provided an easy way for them to do it, by agreeing to make their submission a
The statute gives them an option
rule of the court. But they cannot be compelled.
2
not to do so, and we can't take it away. 88

Far from usurping parties' ability to settle their disputes extra-judicially,
the court, by stating this boundary of consent, explicitly recognized areas
in which parties might choose to settle their disputes apart from court
interference. The court recognized these boundaries again two years later
in the case of Whitehead v. Gray (1831), by stating that although it
believed parties were often dissatisfied with arbitration awards made
outside of the court of law, it would nevertheless uphold this form of
extrajudicial dispute resolution, and would not interfere in it.289
In addition to supporting Independent Arbitration, the court also
continued to show deference and favor toward Arbitration with Award
Enforcement. In the 1847 case of Bell v. Price, the court upheld an
arbitration award that had been made a judgment of the court, issuing a
warning that:
[i]f the principle should be established that an award may be set aside under the
circumstances in which this case is before the court, respectable and competent
men will hesitate to act as arbitrators. They will not subject themselves to the
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id. at 87. (emphasis added).
10 N.J.L. 7 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1828).
Id. at 14.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 19.
Whitehead v. Gray, 12 N.J.L. 36, 36-37 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1830).
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hazard of having their judgments set aside upon a partial representation of the
290
case to the court by a dissatisfied party."

Reference by Order of the Court was similarly upheld. In 1808, the

court in Prosser v. Richards29 1 did not find that the legislature, in the

1794 act, intended to extend to the courts of the justice of the peace the
ability to refer disputes. Perhaps in response, the legislature passed a
statute that granted such jurisdiction in 1818. The 1808 case should not be
read as a desire to limit Reference by Order of the Court in general, however, since in 1811 the court held "[i]t is every day's practice to enlarge
by consent, rules of reference; there is nothing irregular or improper in
it."292 Furthermore, courts did not seem eager to overturn Reference by
Order of the Court awards, apparently doing so only when the parties had
attempted to submit to reference before a case was actually pending, in
contradiction to the requirements of the 1794 statute. 293 The appropriate
forum for resolving a dispute extra-judicially before a case was actually
pending would have been Independent Arbitration or Arbitration with
Award Enforcement.
These cases demonstrate that, throughout the antebellum period, the
New Jersey Supreme Court continued to uphold the three different types
of extrajudicial dispute resolution that were first utilized by the Quakers
and then recognized under the statute. The court then continued to interact
with each of these forms in turn, according to the jurisdiction the court
had been granted (or not granted) over them. 294 In fact, the court explicitly reiterated its support for all three forms of extrajudicial dispute resolution in 1845295 and again in 1857,296 refuting the idea that the goal of the
290. Bell v. Price, 21 N.J.L. 32, 41 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1847). Bell v. Price was affirmed on
appeal with extremely strong language favoring arbitration. The court stated that to allow
"an appeal from the judgment of the arbitrators" was something "the settled decisions of the
courts, founded in policy and justice, will never permit" (Bell v. Price, 22 N.J.L. 578, 591
(N.J. 1824)). See also State v. Gulick, 17 N.J.L. 435 (Court of Errors and Appeals held contempt power would apply to an individual who did not perform an award after it had been
made a rule of the court).
291. Prosser v. Richards, 2 N.J.L. 356, 356-57 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1808).
292. Ayers v. Burt, 3 N.J.L. 310 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1811) (judgment was upheld), see also
Cranmerv. Taylor, 3 N.J.L. 440 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1811) (in response to opposition to reference
in an action of ejectment, the Chief Justice stated "[i]t is the constant practice of this court to
receive and confirm reports of this nature, in an action of eectment.").
293. See Borroughs v. Genung, 2 N.J.L. 96 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1806); Ogden v. Dildine, 3
N.J.L. 7 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1808). The flip side of this rule is shown in Bickham v. Denny, I
N.J.L. 14 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1790), in which the court held that a party to a dispute who had
agreed to remove the dispute to arbitration could not, after the arbitration proceedings had
begun, seek to remove the cause by habeas corpus.
294. Sherron v. Wood, 10 N.J.L. 7, 19 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1828).
295. Although not an arbitration case, the 1845 case of Pintardv. Irwin, 20 N.J.L. 497
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1845), upheld the law of arbitration and reference as contained in the 1794
statute, with the court affirming the defendants' counsel's assertion that "[tihere are three
species of arbitration in this state. First, a common law arbitration [Independent Arbitration].
Secondly, an arbitration under a submission which provides that the submission may be
made a rule of the court [Arbitration with Award Enforcement]. Thirdly, reference of a
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judiciary was to usurp all forms of extrajudicial dispute resolution in the
antebellum period. With these statements, the court acknowledged, again,
the ability of parties to conduct Independent Arbitration apart from any
statutory or court regulation as well as the ability of parties to conduct
Arbitration with Award Enforcement and Reference by Order of the
Court. In restating the 1794 statute in these terms, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey reaffirmed a model of extrajudicial dispute resolution that had
its roots in Quaker ideals of dispute resolution and had been in effect in
New Jersey for over 60 years.
Protections Against Fraud
Another way in which the New Jersey Supreme Court supported
common law and Quaker notions of extrajudicial dispute resolution was
in its support of protection against fraud. These protections ran throughout
the dispute resolution process.
First, the courts upheld the requirement of the parties' consent to settle their disputes extra-judicially, an idea that was supported by the
or
Quakers in their realization that they could not force non-Quakers 297
recalcitrant Quakers to submit to their dispute resolution processes.
This question particularly came up in cases involving principals and
agents, or individuals acting as administrators, with the court generally
holding that the award provisions had to accurately reflect the parties in
dispute.298 In a similar vein, the court overturned an award in which not

cause to referees, upon whose judgment may be entered and execution issued, as in case of
judgment upon verdict. [Reference by Order of the Court]." 20 N.J.L. at 497-504.
296. In the 1857 case of Inslee v. Flagg, 26 N.J.L. 368 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1857), the court
again clarified the law of arbitration and reference by parsing out the 1794 statute. First, the
court stated that the 1794 statute itself referred "exclusively to two classes of cases": (1)
Those where matters are in difference between the parties, and no suit has been commenced
in court; there, if the parties desire to arbitrate their differences, they may make their submission a rule of court, and the court will enforce obedience to the award made, and (2) Those
where suits are already pending; in which cases a reference is provided for, and the report of
the referees is, in effect, substituted for the verdict of a jury." 26 N.J.L. 368, 373-74. These
are the two classes of cases I have termed Arbitration with Award Enforcement and
Reference by Order of the Court. The court then went on to uphold Independent Arbitration,
stating, "The legislature [in creating the 1794 statute] was aware that the proceeding by arbitration already existed at common law, and would continue to exist, notwithstanding the
statute.... 26 N.J.L. 368, 374 (emphasis added)."
297. 1719 yearly meeting, MICHENER, supra note 213, at 269.
298. For instance, in Stephens v. Bacon, 7 N.J.L. I (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1822), the court held
that a reference report had to reflect payment between the principals who were in the original suit and not between a principal and the other party's representative agent. See also
Montfort v. Vanarsdalen, 5 N.J.L. 803 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1819). In Stewart v. Richey, 17 N.J.L.
164 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1839), the court upheld a bond issued to an individual instead of to the
same individual in his capacity as an administrator because the action had accrued after the
testator's death and, therefore, the administrator was able to sue in his individual capacity.
The court seemed to relax the consent requirement, however, when it upheld an award that
had gone to an administrator of one of the parties, rather than to the party itself (a situation
that had proved fatal to previous awards), stating: "The strict and technical rule, that a
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299
all the plaintiffs were listed on the report.
In addition to requiring the parties' consent to submit their dispute to
extrajudicial dispute resolution, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
parties had to agree to the arbitrators chosen to settle their disputes. 300
This reflected Quaker requirements that extrajudicial dispute resolution
30
be unbiased. 1
Once arbitrators had been chosen, the court upheld the statutory
requirement that they be sworn in before determining the award. Although
the court did not initially see this as a requirement for the validity of the
award, especially in Independent Arbitration cases, 302 in later cases the
submission by an administrator to arbitration, is not only a reference of the matter in dispute,
but also an admission by the administrator, that he has assets, cannot prevail over the clear
intention of the parties, as found upon the face of their submission." McKeen v. Oliphant, 18
N.J.L. 442, 449 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1842). Similarly, the court upheld an award that found the title
in land was held by one party's lessors, instead of the party himself, since the court determined the two were essentially the same. Den V. Brands, 15 N.J.L. 465, 465 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1836). However, in the later case of Hoffman v. Hoffman, 26 N.J.L. 175, 180 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1857), the court found an award void for uncertainty because the award did not say whether
a party was to pay as an individual or as the administrator of the estate of a living individual,
a question that seemed to be continually before the court. If the sum was to be paid as an
individual, then all issues submitted to the arbitrators were not decided by them and the
award would be void for uncertainty. See also Montfort v. Vanarsdalen, 5 N.J.L. 803 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. 1819) in which the referees' report was struck down because it awarded a payment
from Montfort as a individual instead of through his representative capacity over the estate
he was administering. The court was also careful to distinquish out the role of the arbitrator
from the role of others engaged in the settling of debt disputes. See Phoenix Iron Co. v. New
York Wrought-Iron Railroad Chair Co., 27 N.J.L. 484 where the secretary of a manufacturing company was not determined to be an arbitrator in her actions of transferring property to
settle debts to creditors.
299. See Souder v. Stout, 3 N.J.L. 8 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1808), in which a report entered as a
judgment was reversed because the original action was brought by several plaintiffs but the
referees' report only found for one plaintiff.
300. For instance, the court upheld an award in a case where two of the three arbitrators
had been substituted out prior to the making of the award because "the substitutions were
endorsed on the original submission and agreement, and expressly refer to what is therein
contained .... McClure v. Gulick, 17 N.J.L. 340, 342 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1839). In a development that may be related to concerns about arbitrator fraud, awards were overturned when
the justice of the peace entering the judgment had served as a referee. See dicta in Den v.
Hopkins, 2 N.J.L. 181 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1807) which suggested that if a judge had previously
acted as an arbitrator in a case, he could not later act as a judge for the same dispute. In
Crane v. Hand, 3 N.J.L. 9 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1808), the report of a referee was quashed because
the justice had served as a referee. The court held that a justice could not appoint himself to
serve as a referee. In Little v. Silverthorne, 3 N.J.L. 255 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1810), the court held
that a justice could not serve as a referee because, if there was any alleged wrongdoing
regarding the reference, the judge would have to sit in judgment of his own conduct as a referee. See also Rogers v. Woodmanse, 3 N.J.L. 510 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1812).
301. THOMAS CLARKSON, 11A PORTRAITURE OF QUAKERISM 82-83 (R. Taylor and Col, 1806).
302. In Ford v. Potts, 6 N.J.L. 388 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1797), the parties had submitted their
dispute to arbitration. While it was pending, the legislature passed the arbitration and reference act of 1794 that provided that arbitrators be sworn in. After the Act was passed, the
arbitrators handed down their award. Potts sued, saying that the award should be invalidated
because the arbitrators were not sworn in. The court upheld the award on the basis that the
award was already pending at the time the statute was passed. Furthermore, the court stated
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court overturned the awards because referees were not sworn in.303 Also
acting in protection against fraudulent conduct, Quaker notions of arbitration required notice to the parties and prohibited ex parte meetings or
perusals of evidence. 304 While generally upholding the right of both parties
to do
to have notice about proceedings, the court seemed uncertain on what305
if one party was absent when the judgment of the award was entered.
Another area in which the court seemed to uphold the statutory,
common law, and Quaker predilections against fraud was in its holdings
that the award must be made by all of the arbitrators to whom the dispute
was submitted. 306 Even in cases in which the court felt compelled to set
that "If the direction [by the legislature to be sworn in] is not complied with, the law subjects
him [the arbitrator] to no penalty; it does not invalidate the proceedings, or empower any
court to set them aside." The requirement that arbitrators be sworn in was meant to benefit
the parties and if they "either neglect or omit to avail themselves of the security offered by
the legislature, it would be unjust that they should be permitted to hold up the award as void.
... The legislature have [sic] not declared, that the omission to take the oath should invalidate the award, and we cannot suppose that this was their meaning." In Thompson v. Harvey,
3 N.J.L. 454 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1811) counsel said that the 1794 Act did not require arbitrators to
be sworn in. The court only stated that it thought that it appeared that the arbitrators had
been sworn in.
303. For cases in which the court overturned awards because arbitrators were not sworn
in, see Parker v. Crammer, 2 N.J.L. 253 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1807); Cramer v. Mathis, 3 N.J.L.
138 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1809); Swayze v. Riddle, 3 N.J.L. 238 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1810); Little v.
Silverthorne, 3 N.J.L. 255 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1810). In Inslee v. Flagg, 26 N.J.L. 368, 369-372
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1857), the court seemed to take a different approach than it previously had
regarding the need for Independent Arbitrators to be sworn in. The court held, in contradiction to the holding of Ford v. Potts, that it was a requirement for all arbitrators to be sworn
in, even arbitrators whose awards would not be made rules of the court, regardless of the
consent of the parties to proceed without a swearing-in. While this was a more comprehensive reading of the statute concerning the swearing-in requirement for Independent
Arbitrators, it did not seem to be intended to suffocate the use of arbitration or reference in
any of their forms since the court throughout this opinion affirmed the various types of arbitration and reference available under the statute as well as the legislature's statutory intent of
making awards more effectual. Inslee, 26 N.J.L. at 396-375.
304. CLARKSON, supra note 301, at 82-83.
305. For instance, the court held that a defendant had to be present when the justice of the
peace entered the referees' report into judgment, Pierson v. Pierson, 7 N.J.L. 125,125-126
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1823), and that the death of one of the parties was not sufficient to hold the referee's report invalid if the death was known but an objection was not entered at the time the
report was being made (Freeborn v. Denman, 8 N.J.L. 116, 116-117 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1825)).
But see Fairholme v. Forker, 3 N.J.L.548 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1813). (upholding the ability of the
justice to enter the judgment in the absence of one of the parties but suggesting in dicta that
the court would consider a claim of illegality of the award had it been brought before them)
306. In Moore v. Ewing, I N.J.L. 167, 169-74 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1792), arbitrators decided
the award and then requested an attorney draw up the award for them. The attorney then
took the award to each arbitrator individually for his signature. The court held that this invalidated the award because the arbitrators had joint authority and should have executed the
award jointly as a means to protect against fraud. Although the court struck down the award
to avoid fraud, the dicta was extremely favorable towards arbitration. Similarly, in Reeves v.
Goff, 2 N.J.L. 133 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1806), an award was overturned because the report was
submitted to three referees but signed by two. The court also held that where the case had
been referred to three referees, the case could not be decided and the report could not be
altered outside of the presence of all three. Egbert v. Smith, 3 N.J.L. 482, 482-483 (N.J. Sup.
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aside an award, the dicta often indicated a desire to highlight the narrowness of the decision and the court's favorable attitude toward arbitration.
For instance, although compelled to set aside an award as a protection
against fraud, the judge in Moore v. Ewing (1792) stated:
I own that I am a great friend to arbitrations; I believe them to be frequently productive of real advantage, and they are not to be hastily or inconsiderately set
aside. I approve, in the highest manner, of the liberality with which courts of justice have reviewed their proceedings, particularly in modem times .... 307

Providing for Necessary Appeals While Supporting Finality of the Awards
As stated previously, although the Quakers placed great emphasis on
their members abiding by the decisions of arbitrators, they also provided for
those instances in which justice would demand the need for an appeal. 308
The court similarly allowed appeals as designated under the statute. 309
Perhaps the greatest concern with appeals was that they could interfere with the finality of awards or allow the judiciary an opportunity to
strike down awards at will. But just as the Quakers commanded disputing
Friends to "engage themselves to stand to and abide by the determination
of such referees or arbitrators," 3 10 so, too, did the court seek to uphold the
finality of awards in a variety of ways.
First, the court refused to set aside an award on the grounds of a
faulty declaration after the award had already been entered as a judgment
of the court. 311 Second, the court seemed willing to strike down awards
only for reasons of fraud (as shown previously) or if the award was
unclear 3 12 or lacked certainty or finality. 3 13 The court was not overly
Ct. 1812), see also Hoff v. Taylor, 5 N.J.L. 976 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1820). Rogers v. Tatum, 25
N.J.L. 281, 284-285 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1855) seemed to extend more deference to the arbitrators
in the area of potential fraud by holding that as long as all three arbitrators were present to
decide the award, then it was not necessary for the award to be signed by all three.
307. Moore v. Ewing, I N.J.L. 167, 169 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1792). Reflecting a similar
predilection to upholding awards, the court in Green v. Lundy, I N.J.L. 497, 498-499 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. 1793) stated that the issuance of two different awards made the awards fatal, but if
one award had been delivered first, then that award would have stood, regardless of the existence of a second award.
308. MICHENER, supra note 213, at 276.

309. Taylor v. Vanderhoof, 14 N.J.L. 214 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1834). Note that the court followed the statute strictly in order to uphold the award in the 1827 case of Coleman v. Warne,
9 N.J.L. 290 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1827), in which it denied the right of one party to appeal a referees' report on the basis that the party did not comply with the statutory requirement that an
affidavit be filed.
310. MICHENER, supranote 213, at 269-70. See also CLARKSON, supra note 301, at 82-83.
311. See Smith v. Minor, I N.J.L. 19, 28 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1790), in which the court held that
an award could not be set aside by a party who took exception to the original declarations
because the exception was taken after the award was already entered. The court said that
there was no precedent for courts to look into the declaration after the making of an award
on reference by consent.
312. See Adams v. Scull, 3 N.J.L. 311, 311 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1811), in which an award was
made void because the fact that "no specific penalty was awarded, but fractional parts of two
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strict concerning what constituted a clear award. It confirmed that awards
had to be certain and final but also stated that arbitrators did not have to
use technical language in their awards. 3 14 It appeared to relax notions of
certainty in later years. 3 15 Although initially awards could be overturned
because parties did not decide all of the matters submitted to them, 3 16 the
court later attempted to uphold at least a portion of an award, even when
another portion was void. For instance, in McKeen v. Oliphant,the court
reiterated the general rule that "[a]n award may be good, though part of it
3 17
In
be made of a thing not within the submission, such part being void."
1855, the court again reiterated that rule with the statement that an award
that was overly broad remained valid with respect to the items that had
been submitted to the arbitrators. 318 In the same decision, the court went
on to uphold extrajudicial dispute resolution explicitly, stating that, "[t]he
modem rule is, that awards shall be interpreted favorably, and that every
reasonable intendment shall be made in their support. If it be possible to
expound an award favorably, the court will do so."319
penalties" meant that no judgment had been rendered. See also Hoagland v. Veghte, 23
N.J.L. 92 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1851), in which the court held that a previous award in an ongoing
dispute between the parties would be conclusive and parol evidence could be used to determine what exactly had been included in a previous award and what disputes still remained.
313. For instance, in McKeen v. Oliphant, 18 N.J.L. 442, 442-446 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1842),
the court emphasized the rule that awards must be "certain, mutual, and final" as to matters
submitted. This finality was reflected in Webb v. Fish, 4 N.J.L. 431, 431-434 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1817), in which the court applied a previous award between the parties regarding ownership
of a road to a subsequent conflict between the parties regarding use of the same road.
314. Hazen v. Administrators of Daniel Addis, 14 N.J.L. 333, 335-338 (NJ. Sup. Ct.
1834); see also McKeen v. Allen, 17 N.J.L. 506 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1840). Care in use of language
was required as a procedural safeguard, however, when bringing an action of debt on bond
for the performance of an award. See Henries v. Stiers, 8 N.J.L. 364 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1834),
where the court required the plaintiff to state the same breach in both his initial declaration
and his replication in order to keep one dispute before the court for resolution.
315. The court stated a more relaxed rule for certainty of an award that did not seem certain
on its face and held that the award did not have to be signed by all three arbitrators so long as
all three arbitrators were there to decide the award. Rogers v. Tatum, 25 N.J.L. 281, 284-85
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1855); see also Hoffman v. Hoffman, 26 N.J.L. 175, 177-79 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1857).
316. See Harker v. Hough, 7 N.J.L. 428 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1802); Richards v. Drinker, 6 N.J.L.
307 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1796); see also Craig v. Craig, 9 N.J.L. 198 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1827), in which
the court also seemed favorable toward reference when it struck down a report on the basis
that multiple individual actions were sent to reference but the report issued by the referees was
joint. In doing so, the court reluctantly stated that it would adhere to the rules of the law for
safety's sake even though "real justice may have been done between the parties by the report."
317. 18 N.J.L. at 446; see also the earlier case of Sheppard v. Stites, 7 N.J.L. 90 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1823) (an arbitration award was void for uncertainty only to the degree that that part of the award
was uncertain) and the later case of Hoagland v. Veghte, 23 N.J.L. 92, 95 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1851)
("Every intendment will be made in favor of an award, and the bad will be separated from the
good, if possible."). Also on the topic of appropriate submission and award, the court held that
although arbitrators had power to award the conveyance of land, they did not have power to actually convey the land within the award. Den v.Allen, 2 N.J.L. 32 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1806).
318. Rogers, 25 N.J.L. at 282.
319. 25 N.J.L. at 284. The case of Smith v. Demarest, 8 N.J.L. 195 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1825),
is such a case where every possible legal intendment was made to uphold the award. The
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One other area that touched on the finality of the award was the possibility that the arbitrators had made mistakes of law or fact. In an 1855 decision favoring extrajudicial dispute resolution, the court upheld an arbitration award between the parties, saying that the statute of 1794 allowed
relief from an award due only to misbehavior, corruption or undue means,
which included the arbitrator misapplying the law after he had said he
meant to decide by the law, 320 or the arbitrator admitting to a mistake of
fact. 32 1 The court continued to show deference the next year in Richardson
v. John,322 in which it held that parties who had submitted their differences

to non-court-appointed reference were bound by the referees' report, mistakes and all: "The parties agree to take the judgment of others, instead of
their own, and having so agreed, they are bound by that judgment just as
much as if they had agreed upon the quantity and price themselves." 323 The
court went on to state that, "the general rule is, that where parties agree to
parties submitted their disputes to Independent Arbitration and one party sued for non-performance. The court upheld the award in spite of claims that the award did not decide all
matters submitted, that it changed from what was submitted, that it was uncertain in part,
and that the arbitrators had exceeded their authority. See also Atkinson v. Townley, 1 N.J.L.
444 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1795), in which Townley claimed that Atkinson had conducted an cx
parte meeting with the arbitrators. The court stated that "[a]wards should not be set aside on
the suspicion of the interested party" and that even "[i]f the affidavit had been full and
explicit, we do not think the uncorroborated affidavit of the party against whom the award is
given, would be sufficient to justify us in setting it aside." For earlier example of court deference, see Imlay v. Wikoff, 4 N.J.L. 153, 161 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1818), where the court stated
"that the reasons for setting aside the award were insufficient" and that the award should be
upheld. The court also required the parties themselves to uphold the award, and refused an
action on an award by a party who had not signed a release of claims as had been required
by that award. Hugg v. Collins, 18 N.J.L. 294, 294-295 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1841).
320. It is essential here that the arbitrator had to both say that he meant to apply the law
and then apply the law incorrectly. The court's reasoning was that this combination would
suggest that the arbitrator had inadvertently gone against his own intent. In general, an arbitrator was not required to apply the law, and was not prohibited in setting forth an award in
contradiction to the law, if that was the arbitrator's intent.
321. Taylor v. Sayre, 24 N.J.L. 647 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1855). Even mistake of fact may not be
enough, when that mistake is affirmed in the finality of a bond on the award. In Baker v.
Baker, 28 N.J.L. 13 (1859), the arbitrator erroneously computed the interest on a debt due
between the parties. Once a bond was given for the amount calculated by the arbitrator, the
other party's right to claim the difference was lost.
322. 26 N.J.L. 130 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1856).
323. Id. at 131. For a previous case on mistake of fact and law, see Sherron v. Wood, 10
N.J.L. 7, 12 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1828), in which the court stated that, "Misconduct of an arbitrator
cannot be pleaded or set up as a defence [sic] to an action at law upon an arbitration bond.
The same rule prevails with respect to error or mistake of law or fact in making an award
which does not appear upon the face of it." Indeed, parties could not even revoke a reference
report if they wanted to. In Ferris v. Munn, 22 N.J.L. 161 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1849), the court held
that Reference by Order of the Court, "though made with the consent of the parties, is the act
of the court, and cannot be revoked by the party, but only discharged by the court on mutual
consent." But see Berry v. Caller, 6 N.J.L. 179 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1822) in which the court held
that a report of a sum due from the defendant to the plaintiff although intended to be final,
could be returned to the auditors who made it if there was a mistake of law. It is unclear
from the case language whether the auditors were filing a special report for the court or if
they were acting as referees to fully resolve the dispute.
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refer a matter to the judgment of others, their judgment is conclusive,
unless fraud, collusion, or some plain, palpable mistake upon the face of the
324
award appears, which is certified to or admitted by the arbitrators."
Guards Against Reversing on Mere Technicalities
Early on, the courts did not attempt to expand their ability to reverse
awards on technicalities, 325 and, indeed, upheld arbitration according to the
procedural guidelines outlined in the statute. 326 Areas in which the court
exhibited a more confused attitude toward technicalities under the statute
include the areas of evidence 327 and the justice's filing of the reference
report into the docket.3 28 The court seemed to hold more strictly to the statu324. Richardson,26 N.J.L. at 132.
325. For instance, in Schneck v. Voorhees, 7 N.J.L. 383 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1800), arbitrators
had accidentally switched the parties' names. The error was immediately realized and rectified, and the court held that the award would stand. In Coryell v. Coryell, 1 N.J.L. 441, 442
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1795) the court held that an award could be vacated by the court if one party
asked for and was not granted a proper adjournment, but the court denied the attempt to
vacate the award in this case on the grounds that that party seemed to ask for the adjournment only when he had a hint that the award would be unfavorable to him. In Coxe v. Lundy,
1 N.J.L. 295, 296 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1794), the court held that although it had previously
required arbitration awards to be stated in technical language, that was no longer a requirement, specifically because "in modern times a greater latitude and more liberality has been
found beneficial to all parties, and common words are sufficient; their meaning is to be
expounded according to the intentions of the arbitrators, appearing on the award."
326. See Pancoast v. Curtis, 6 N.J.L. 415 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1798), in which the court held
that an award was published when it was read and filed in court and that exceptions to
awards must come within the designated time period. In Harrison v. Sloan, 6 N.J.L. 410
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1797), the court quashed a certiorari claiming that the individual's right to a
jury trial had been denied by the submission of his dispute to referees under the 1790 statute.
The court upheld the reference, stating that the referees had to act before they could determine if the appointment of the referees was legal.
327. In the area of evidence, the court had originally held that arbitrators did not have to
follow strict laws of evidence. Livingston v. Combs, I N.J.L. 50 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1790). The flip
side of this rule for arbitration was seen in Jessup v. Cook, 6 N.J.L. 434, (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1798),
in which it was held that the arbitrators derived their authority from the parties' consent and
did not constitute a typical court. Therefore, the evidence admitted in a previous arbitration
could not be admitted in a subsequent case in a court of law. Later, the court held in
Burroughs v. Thorne, 5 N.J.L. 910 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1820), that arbitrators needed to follow the
rules of evidence regarding witnesses. See also Lyre's Exec. V. Fenimore, 3 N.J.L. 489, 492
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1812). In Seamans v. Pharo,4 N.HJ.L. 143, 143 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1818), the court
held that court cases sent to referees needed to follow rules for affidavits. The court also held
that an award would not be set aside on the grounds that one party acted as a witness when
the other party had consented to the first party serving as a witness. Fennimore v. Childs, 6
N.J.L. 386 (N.J. Sup. CL 1797). In spite of its increase in applying the rules of evidence (or,
perhaps, because of), the court did hold that an arbitration award could serve as evidence in a
subsequent case. See Trautx v. Adm'x ofTraux, 2 N.J.L. 153 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1807).
328. In 1801-1810, awards were overturned because the judgment was not entered on the
justice's docket. See Crandallv. Denny, 2 N.J.L. 128 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1806); Johnson v. Johnson,
2 N.J.L. 300, 300 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1807); Steelman v. Stewart, 2 N.J.L. 299 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1807);
Little v. Fleming, 3 N.J.L. 139 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1809); Moreton v. Scroggy, 3 N.J.L. 252 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. 1810). But see Chance v. Chambers, 2 N.J.L. 362 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1808) (reference
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tory requirements concerning time deadlines.3 29 In the area of determining
costs, the court evidenced a trend toward upholding a variety of procedural
details while still avoiding overturning awards on technicalities. 330 The
33 1
court overturned a report on grounds that appeared to be egregious error,
but later exhibited a very favorable attitude toward reference when, in an
1827 case upholding a report with a minor error, the court stated:
it would be entirely too strict; it would be losing the substance in search of the shadow, to set aside a report for a difference scarcely discernible, except by legal eyes,
and which it is making no great presumption to suppose, was observed neither by
the referees nor by the parties, who were unattended by counsel, unless indeed some
practical injury has resulted to plaintiff; unless some matters not within the cause,
332
were actually made the subjects of enquiry [sic] and adjudicated by the referees.

Conclusion to the New Jersey Account
New Jersey passed its initial arbitration statutes while it was still
under heavy Quaker influence. It seems unlikely that an area so heavily
dominated by Quakers (and Quaker ideology) would purposefully enact
report upheld even though the justice entered only the report's substance but not the report at

large into his docket). See also Ridgway v. Fairholm, 3 N.J.L. 464 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1811) (court
held it was not fatal that a demand was not filed with the justice, and it was a mere error and not
a fatal mistake that the justice initially entered only two of the three referees on the docket).
329. In 1801-1810, an award was overturned because the report was returned after the designated time period, White v. Kemble, 3 N.J.L. 53 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1808) and, in Ross v. Ford, 3
N.J.L. 465 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1811), a report was struck down because the referring justice's term
of office ended before the report was returned. Also related to deadlines, the court allowed a
party to obtain a writ of attachment if the other party did not perform as required by the
award, but the court did require there first be an order of the court to justify the issuance of
the attachment. M'Dermot v. Butler, 10 N.J.L. 158, 158-160 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1828).
330. The court seemed particularly concerned about following the statutory guidelines
regarding costs. In Anonymous, 2 NJ.L. 213 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1807), the court complied with
statutory guidelines regarding the costs that could be granted after awards had been made a
rule of the court. In 1818, the court held that costs would follow established rules unless the
award determined otherwise. See Den, ex dem. Anderson v. Exton, 4 N.J.L. 201 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. 1818). In Bishop v. Woodruff 3 N.J.L. 110, 110-111 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1809) the court held
that a party required to pay according to the deadline given in the award must pay by the
deadline and could not wait for the arrival of a statement requiring payment. In Ogden v.
Dildine, 3 N.J.L. 7, 8 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1808) the court reversed a report judgment for several
reasons, one of which was that it was entered in figures. But see Bozorth v. Prickett, 2 N.J.L.
251 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1807) (referee report upheld in spite of one party's claim that it should be
struck down because the monetary award was written in figures instead of numbers); Warder
v. Whitall, I N.J.L. 98, 98-99 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1791) (court upheld an arbitration award written
in terms of "sterling money of Great Britain" in spite of a New Jersey law stating that all
New Jersey court judgments had to be written in New Jersey currency).
331. See Bowen v. Lanning, 2 N.J.L. 130, 130 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1806) in which the court
stated, of a reference that did not comply with statutory requirements and was incomplete,
that, "The errors are manifest the proceedings must be set aside, and made null and void."
332. Westcot v. Somers, 9 N.J.L. 99, 99-101 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1827). The difference here
that one party relied on to attempt to have the report struck down was that the original rule
for reference stated "all matters in difference in the said cause be submitted" and the report

stated "all matters in difference between the parties in the said cause to be submitted."
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legislative statutes that would undermine the form of dispute resolution
Quakers believed to be the most legitimate. One might think that the legislature itself was not composed of those upholding Quaker ideology, but
the governments of both East and West Jersey were controlled by Quaker
ideals. 3 33 West Jersey was a Quaker settlement that resembled Quaker
Pennsylvania in its laws and court system, while Quakers in East Jersey
had a "controlling interest in land and government." 334 Furthermore, at
passed in East and
least one historian has stated that statutes such as those
335
West Jersey "were intended to advance arbitration."
Indeed, the 1794 statute reflected this Quaker influence, both at the
time of its enactment and in the years following. And New Jersey retained
this same 1794 extrajudicial dispute resolution law, with few modifications, throughout the antebellum period. Although New Jersey regulated
arbitration and reference when they entered the court system, it did so
according to the terms of the 1794 statute and its subsequent, minor modifications, and it did so in keeping with Quaker customs for encouraging
and regulating extrajudicial dispute resolution. Thus, in contradiction to
Horwitz's Pennsylvania history, extrajudicial dispute resolution was not
regulated and interpreted out of existence in New Jersey. Instead, it continued in use throughout the antebellum period, much as the Quakers had
originally promoted it.
The interesting thing about Horwitz's history is that, like New
Jersey, Pennsylvania passed its first arbitration statutes while it was still
highly influenced by Quaker ideas on arbitration and highly predisposed
to view arbitration quite favorably. 336 It does not seem consistent to hold
that these two neighboring states, which shared such a strong and similar
Quaker history and influence, would go on to treat extrajudicial dispute
resolution so differently. Due to the foundational similarities of the two
states, it is quite possible that the story of New Jersey may be the story of
Pennsylvania as well.
To this end, although many of the judicial interactions with the
extrajudicial dispute resolution statutes Horwitz found in Pennsylvania
existed in New Jersey as well, it does not appear that, in New Jersey at
least, these actions "clearly represented a newly emerging pattern of hostility to extrajudicial settlement of disputes." 337 Instead, the research
shows that while New Jersey law regarding extrajudicial dispute resolution was transformed over time, it was transformed in a manner in keeping with Quaker ideology that favored extrajudicial dispute resolution,
and not in a manner that intended it to be transcended by the emerging
legal profession, at least not in the 1780-1860 time period.
333. HOFFER, supra note 178, at 32.
334. AUERBACH, supra note 242, at 30 (for West Jersey as a Quaker settlement.); HOFFER,
supra note 178, at 32 (for Quaker influence in East and West Jersey).
335. KELLOR, supra note 243, at 16.

336. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 151-52 (for pro-arbitration nature of Pennsylvania as late
as 1790 and until the Revolution).
337. HORwJTrZ, supra note 1, at 152.
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CONCLUSION
In his work, The Transformation of American Law: 1780-1860,
Morton Horwitz asserts that the practice of arbitration ceased to exist in
antebellum America as the result of collusion between the merchant and
lawyer classes in New York, Massachusetts, and South Carolina, and as the
by-product of a judicial hostility that disregarded Quaker attitudes towards
dispute resolution in Pennsylvania. It is a story of a revolutionary change in
the law that finds its motivations in the political and economic spheres.
Horwitz suggests that his findings would be uniform across all states in the
antebellum period. Yet, careful study of Kentucky and New Jersey shows
that contravening social and ideological conditions prevent his findings
from holding true across all states.
Horwitz begins his history of the triumph of law over arbitration
from 1780-1860 with a general theme of lawyer-merchant conflict; the
increase and then decrease of the use of arbitration by the merchant class;
the merchants' alliance with the legal community to effectively overthrow
arbitration; and the judiciary's use of statutory law to defeat arbitration
awards. Horwitz claims that, in defeating those awards, the judiciary
abandoned its common law deference to arbitration, began reversing on
technicalities, refused to refer matters of law, and triumphed through the
merchants' growing use of appeals. Each of these claims assumes a judiciary that was hostile to the use of arbitration.
A close study of the state of Kentucky demonstrates that these
claims do not apply. Kentucky was an agricultural state that remained
embroiled in land-dispute conflict through most of the nineteenth century.
It was this social conflict over land claims, and its seeming influence in
the political and economic spheres, and not a mercantile pre-commercial
animosity toward lawyers, that fueled the need for and use of arbitration
m antebellum Kentucky. Furthermore, Kentucky boasted a judiciary
throughout the mid-nineteenth century that was extremely reluctant to
overturn both common law and statutory arbitration awards. The
Kentucky judiciary exhibited this attitude by focusing on intent rather
than technicalities, continuing to refer matters of law, and generally supporting the use of arbitration as a valid and long-favored form of extrajudicial dispute resolution.
Research on the Quaker state of New Jersey counters Horwitz's history. Horwitz claims that the Pennsylvania Quakers initially supported the
use of arbitration but that the Pennsylvania judiciary, which grew increasingly hostile to arbitration, undermined and eventually destroyed that support. Horwitz's main proof for this assertion was the manner in which the
Pennsylvania judiciary applied the Pennsylvania statutes governing arbitration in the state. Thus Horwitz argues that the statutes themselves were
part of the legal elite's attempt to legislate arbitration out of existence and
that the judiciary's strict interpretation of those statutes ultimately led to
arbitration's demise.
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A study of New Jersey provides a different story. In 1794, New
Jersey enacted a law supporting the use of extrajudicial dispute resolution.
It was this law, with minor adjustments, that governed the use of extrajudicial dispute resolution in New Jersey throughout the antebellum period.
A close study of New Jersey court dicta and decisions shows that the New
Jersey judiciary consistently interpreted the extrajudicial dispute resolution cases that came before it in light of this statute. Horwitz sees the
same behavior in Pennsylvania as an effort by the judiciary to construe
statutory law governing extrajudicial dispute resolution strictly, so as to
effectively eliminate the use of extrajudicial dispute resolution in that
state. That was not the pattern in New Jersey. While it is true that the New
Jersey judiciary was careful to decide its extrajudicial dispute resolution
cases in keeping with the statutory law, the statutory law itself upheld and
supported extrajudicial dispute resolution. More specifically, the statutory
law reflected Quaker ideology of what extrajudicial dispute resolution
was all about. Like the Quaker vision of extrajudicial dispute resolution,
statutory extrajudicial dispute resolution in New Jersey recognized the
ability of parties to settle their disputes completely outside of court while
also providing for additional avenues for award enforcement and agreeing
to arbitration in a pending action, protections against fraud, necessary
appeals, the finality of awards, and guards against reversing on mere technicalities. Thus, by construing the extrajudicial dispute resolution decisions that came before it in light of the New Jersey extrajudicial dispute
resolution statutes, the New Jersey judiciary was not evidencing political
hostility toward extrajudicial means of dispute resolution but, instead, was
simply continuing to support and uphold a particularly Quaker vision of
extrajudicial dispute resolution as outlined by the statute.
Horwitz's history of a merchant-lawyer alliance that sought to eliminate arbitration and an emerging judiciary that was hostile to its use are
inapplicable to the states of Kentucky and New Jersey in the antebellum
period. In these states, existing social and ideological conditions (respectively) prompted the legislatures and the courts to uphold extrajudicial
dispute resolution and to do so in a way that reflected past support of
extrajudicial dispute resolution while adapting it to the current needs of
their populations. Thus, for at least these two states, it seems more accurate to say that, although it was at times transformed, the use of extrajudicial dispute resolution was not transcended by the political jealousies of
an emerging legal system in the antebellum period.
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